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This thesis is composed of three essays on macroeconomic dynamics. 
    The first chapter is a joint work with my supervisor, and it explores whether 
inflation taxation, a substitute for income taxation given fixed government spending, 
can mitigate business fluctuations, promote growth and enhance welfare by 
extending the Matsuyama model with endogenous growth through endogenous 
cycles to incorporate money in the utility function. Here, faster money growth 
promotes capital accumulation, innovation and growth by reducing income taxes. 
At low money growth rates, faster money growth enlarges fluctuations of period-
two cycles. However, sufficiently high money growth rates can eliminate 
endogenous cycles and accelerate oscillatory convergence under plausible 
conditions. Numerically, optimal money growth enhances welfare based on 
calibration. 
The second chapter is a joint work with Assistant Professor Zhu Shenghao, and it 
determines the social optimal path in the innovation-cycle model of Matsuyama 
(1999, 2001) and explore whether inflation and taxation can be used to obtain the 
social optimum under a cash-in-advance constraint. The socially optimal path 
allows innovation to occur at a lower level of the capital-variety ratio than the 
equilibrium path. Also, starting from a binding capital constraint on innovation, the 
socially optimal path can move from the neoclassical regime without innovation 
towards the balanced path with innovation through a temporary transition.        
vi 
 
    The third chapter again is a joint work with my supervisor, which extends one of 
the main findings in Bossmann et al. (2007). ("Bequests, taxation and the 
distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model", Journal of Public Economics, 
91, 1247-1271.) Bequest motives per se reduce wealth inequality. We show that the 
result holds for a stronger criterion of inequality comparison between distributions. 
Bossmann et al. (2007) use the coefficient of variation as the inequality measure. 
Our Lorenz dominance result implies their result. We also strengthen two other 
conclusions in Bossmann et al. (2007). Earnings ability inheritance could increase 
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Inflation, taxation, welfare and growth through cycles with money in utility  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Among the G7 countries, the United States is a leading innovator and has the highest 
income per capita (from 10% to 28% higher than the others), the lowest ratio of tax 
revenue to GDP, and the highest inflation in the last decade according to Table 1. 
Also, many industrial nations have experienced significant medium-term oscillations 
in investment, R&D spending, and output as shown in Comin and Gertler (2006). At 
the medium frequency of 10 years, for example, the US data from 1929 to 2011 
display procyclical movements, negative serial correlations, and large standard 
deviations concerning investment, R&D spending, real money balance, and output, as 
shown in Table 2.  
 Growth through medium-frequency period-2 cycles arises for plausible 
parameterization in Matsuyama (1999, 2001), conditioning the Romer-style 
intermediate goods production and innovation for new intermediates on the Solow-
style capital accumulation.
1
 New products are sold exclusively for one period. 
Breakeven for innovation is only possible if capital per variety is abundant enough 
for a profitable scale of demand. Efficiency losses result from monopolistic pricing of 
                                                            
1 Some other models also generate endogenous cycles and endogenous growth in different 
ways, such as learning-by-doing and innovation, without capital accumulation; see the cited 
work in Matsuyama (1999, 2001). With capital accumulation and R&D for new 
intermediates, Comin and Gertler (2006) find positive cross and serial correlations of 
investment, R&D spending and output and greater variances at medium frequency from 
model simulations by assuming market power to consumers on the labor market and 
maintaining the assumption in the Romer model that R&D spending is from current output.  
1
  
new products, fluctuating consumption, and distorting income taxation.  
 In this paper we explore whether money growth, as a substitute for tax 
financing, mitigate fluctuations, promote growth, and enhance welfare by 
incorporating money-in-the-utility-function into the Matsuyama (1999, 2001) model. 
It sheds some new light on monetary policy. First, faster money growth promotes 
capital accumulation, innovation, and output growth by reducing income tax rates 
and making money holding more costly. Second, faster money growth magnifies 
fluctuations of period-two cycles at low money growth rates but eliminates cyclical 
fluctuations asymptotically at high money growth rates, whereas money contraction 
may lead to chaotic dynamics. Quantitatively, we set a benchmark case calibrated to 
the US economy with 6% annual money growth (in M1 or M2), 3% inflation, and 3% 
GDP growth. This benchmark case is found to be on the oscillatory convergent path. 
Counterfactual experiments suggest an optimal annual money (M2) growth rate at 2.4% 
and thus excessive money growth in the United States. Cutting the money growth rate 
from 6% to 2.4% can eliminate the 3% inflation, reduce output growth slightly (by 
0.04 percentage points), and increase welfare by as much as a 0.7% increase in 
consumption in every period.   
 Indeed, existing empirical evidence indicates substantial and statistically 
significant negative effects of distortional taxes on long-run per capita GDP growth; 
see, e.g., Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) and Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller 
(2001). The US annual data during 1929-2011 also suggest that money growth (real 
or nominal) has a negative effect on the ratio of income tax revenue to GDP and a 
2
  
positive effect on GDP growth, as shown in Table 3, when government spending is 
controlled for. In the past decade, the US Fed has used pro-investment monetary 
policy and reconfirmed it by the current open-ended QE3. 
 Inflation is typically found to be welfare reducing in the literature no matter 
whether money demand is driven by a cash-in-advance constraint, a transaction 
technology with money as an intermediate input, or real money balances in the utility 
function.
2
 The intuition is based on the Friedman rule of money growth that aims at a 
zero nominal interest rate at which a zero private cost of holding money is equal to 
the zero social cost of providing money. In our model, the welfare cost of inflation 
eventually dominates the positive welfare effect of money growth but the latter 
supports a money growth rate in excess of the Friedman rule. 
 Our support of a money growth rate exceeding the Friedman rule accords with 
another branch of literature with various market frictions.
3
 However, we use a 
different mechanism for money growth to affect the economy and raise welfare by 
mitigating cycles and promoting investment and innovation. Endogenous cycles or 
non-convergent dynamic paths have also been analyzed in different kinds of 
monetary models.
4
 Part of our results agrees with some of the previous studies in that 
                                                            
2 See, e.g., Friedman (1969), Stockman (1981), Kimbrough (1986), Prescott (1987), Cooley 
and Hansen (1989), Cole and Stockman (1992), Gomme (1993), Correia and Teles (1996), 
Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998), Wu and Zhang (1998, 
2000), Lucas (2000), Erosa and Ventura (2002), Gahvari (2007), and Faig and Li (2009). 
3 The previous studies have done so in several ways: inflation taxation as a substitute for 
income taxation for public finance in Phelps (1973), Braun (1994), and Palivos and Yip 
(1995); increasing returns to scale in the transaction-cost technology in Guidotti and Vegh 
(1993); borrowing constraints in Shi (1999); investment externalities in Rebelo and Xie 
(1999), and Ho, Zeng and Zhang (2007); segregations in assets and goods markets in 
Williamson (2008); and rigid nominal wages in Adam and Billi (2008), Kurozumi (2008), 
Levine, McAdam and Pearlman (2008), and  Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). 
4 This literature includes models with overlapping-generations in Grandmont (1986), with 
3
  
high enough money growth rates can eliminate endogenous cycles. Again, in doing so, 
our different model leads to different interpretations and implications: Money growth 
promotes investment to overcome the capital requirement constraint on innovation 
and intermediate goods production, initially magnifying period-two cycles but 
eventually inducing oscillatory convergence. Also, money contraction in our model 
may lead to chaotic dynamics.  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
model. Section 3 focuses on the equilibrium and derives the analytical results. 
Section 4 provides the calibration and numerical simulations. The last section 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
1.2 The model with money in the utility function 
We extend the Matsuyama (1999, 2001) model of endogenous growth through 
endogenous cycles to include real money balances in the preference of identical 
agents of size   who live forever. Time is discrete, ranging from 0 to infinity.  
 
1.2.1 The consumer  
Let        and    be the amount of nominal money balance per agent, real 
consumption per agent, and the price level, respectively. The preference is assumed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
cash-in-advance in Woodford (1994) and Michener and Ravikumar (1998), and with 
money-in-the-utility-function in Brock (1974), Gray (1984), Obstfeld (1984), Matsuyama 





     
  
              ,                      (1) 
where         is the discounting factor. We assume that the utility function        is 
strictly increasing and strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions for a unique 
interior solution. For tractability, a logarithmic utility function  (        )      
           is assumed, where     stands for the taste for the utility derived from 
real money balances.  
 Given a time-invariant flat rate of a uniform, time invariant income tax   and 
an asset     accumulated prior to  , a consumer's budget constraint in period   is: 
   
    
  
                     
  
  
   ,                 (2) 
where           are the real wage rate and the real gross interest rate respectively, 
and    is the asset level at the end of period  . Labor supply is treated inelastic and 
normalized to one unit per consumer. The solvency condition faced by the consumer 
is             
 
     . 
 The government uses the income tax and the inflation tax (seignorage) to 
finance its spending. The government spending is assumed to be a fixed fraction   of 
aggregate output                    . The government budget constraint is 
assumed to be balanced in every period: 
      
     
  
    ,                        (3) 
where        is aggregate (nominal) money supply available at the beginning of 
period   and                      is the growth rate of money supply during 
period  . In equilibrium,          . It is worth mentioning that the income tax 
5
  
is the major source of government revenue in countries such as the United States. 
Moreover, for any government policy       that remains constant over time, the price 
level    will change together with output to balance the government budget in (3) in 
equilibrium. Also, the public-finance feature with income taxation is essential for 
money to play an important role in this dynamic model with rational consumers faced 
with an infinite planning horizon. Otherwise, should the revenue from issuing money 
be used as a lump-sum transfer or should the alternative tax is lump-sum, money 
growth would be neutral in our model as in Wang and Yip (1992) and the papers cited 
therein. In the present model with inefficiency of monopoly pricing, a welfare 
improving combination of money growth and income taxation is better than any 
combination of money growth and fiscal policy (such as lump-sum or consumption 
taxation) that maintains neutrality. 
 The consumer's problem can be formulated as  
                 
  
         
  
  
                      
    
  
       
  
  
  , 
subject to the solvency condition, given initial stocks           in period 0. 
 The optimal conditions for this problem are provided below for    : 
      
      
   
        ,                (4) 
          
                        ,       (5) 
         
   












     
    
   ,       (6) 
       
                  
                   .                           (7) 
Using the logarithmic utility function, the consumer's choice of a sequence 
6
  
           in equilibrium is determined by the consumer budget constraint (2), the 
government budget constraint (3),             ,              , and the 
optimal conditions (4)-(7). The consumer’s choice is a function of market prices 
          , per capita output   , the tax rate  , the rate of inflation      
         , and the initial asset      for    : 
                 ,                                 (8) 




                    
                   
.                                                           (10) 
Here, equation (8) follows from the optimal conditions (4) and (5). Equation (9) 
follows from the consumer budget constraint and the government budget constraint 
with             . Equation (10) emerges from the optimal conditions (4), (5) 
and (6). According to (10), the inflation rate between period   and     has a direct 
negative effect on money demand in period   since it drives up the cost of holding 
money. A full characterization of the equilibrium solution will be given after 
considering production and innovation.  
 
1.2.2 Production and innovation 
Following Matsuyama (1999), the final goods production uses capital      (saved 
from the preceding period) and labor  . Capital must be converted into a variety of 
differentiated intermediate products      , and then be aggregated into a composite 
by a CES function. The composite of intermediate products and labor are combined 
via a Cobb-Douglas technology for final goods production: 
7
  
        
            
       
 
   ,                                                     (11) 
where         is total factor productivity,         is the direct partial elasticity 
of substitution between each pair of intermediates, and        is the range of 
intermediates available in period  . One unit of an intermediate can be converted 
from   units of capital. There is no uncertainty in the form of shocks in technology in 
this model. So we avoid such questions as how monetary policy should respond to 
these shocks; for the literature on such questions, see, e.g., Williamson (1996) and 
Rebelo and Xie (1999). 
          The intermediates introduced prior to  ,           , are supplied 
competitively at the marginal cost         
     . The new ones may be 
introduced at a fixed cost of   units of capital each. Once introduced, they are 
supplied monopolistically, with one period exclusive rights, at a price         
  
           for            , owing to the constant price elasticity  . Since all 
intermediates enter final goods production symmetrically,         
  for   
        ,          
  for           , and their relative demand by final goods 















  .                                        (12) 
Given the symmetric role of all intermediates in final goods production in (11), the 
greater use of competitively supplied old intermediates than monopolistically 
supplied new intermediates in (12) must cause a loss of efficiency. This efficiency 
loss has been a different subject of how to use subsidies for efficiency improvements 
in the literature; see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Zeng and Zhang (2007). 
8
  
         The one-period monopolistic profit for an innovator is   
    
   
  
      
    . There is free entry to innovative activities, implying non-positive 
profits, i.e.    
        . However, there is no innovation at all unless it can 
break even. It follows that 
   
                          
                    .         (13)  
 The resource constraint on the use of available capital in period   is 
                        
               
    .         (14) 
This constraint differs from the conventional assumption in the earlier R&D growth 
models where R&D activities and intermediate goods production cost current final 
goods rather than cost previously accumulated capital. With the conventional 
assumption, the model would become an AK style model whereby the economy 
would always be on the balanced growth path without cyclical fluctuation.  
 Substituting equations (12) and (13) into (14) leads to 
    






      
    
    
     ,          (15)  
                 
    
  
                                                          (16) 
where  




   
, 
which increases with  , ranging from 1 to            for        . In equation 
(16), new intermediates are introduced when available capital is abundant enough 
relative to available intermediates. 
 From equations (13), (15) and (16), total output equals 
    
          
         
                          
                                                                









   
 
   
. 
According to equation (17), when there is insufficient capital per variety available for 
innovation, output in the economy is determined in a neoclassical style (Solow 
regime). By contrast, when there is sufficient capital per variety available for 
innovation, output determination follows an AK style (Romer regime). 
 
1.3 Equilibrium and results  
In this model, production factors are compensated according to             and 
                 . In equilibrium,       . Combine these into equations (8), 
(9) and (10) and guess that there is a constant saving rate   such that        
         . Using this guess in (9), we obtain                  . 
Substituting this into (8) yields                    . Multiplying    on both 
sides and noting           
 
 
     , we obtain  
        
 
 
        .                     (18) 
 So       
 
 
           ) and accordingly we have 
                             .      (19) 
The derivation of a time-invariant relationship between the tax rate and the money 
growth rate takes a few steps. First, multiply the numerator and the denominator of 
the right-hand side of equation (10) by    and multiply both sides by  . Then, 
substituting equation (19) and                    into it yields: 
   
  
 
          
 
 
                
 
 
              
       
 
 




 Substituting the government budget constraint 
   
    
  
 
    
           and 
(18) into the above equation and rearranging terms gives rise to: 
       
  
                        
 
 
         . 
Using              and the government budget constraint 





    
    , the above equation can be further written as: 
          
  
                           
 
 
       . 
Imposing a constant money growth rate          , we obtain the equilibrium 
relationship between a time-invariant tax rate and a time-invariant rate of (nominal) 
money supply growth:  
        
                           
                  
.       (20) 
 When the money growth rate equals zero in equation (20), the income tax rate 
equals  , i.e.       . Incentive compatibility requires       , which sets a lower 
bound on the money growth rate  .  Differentiating      in equation (20) with 
respect to   confirms a decreasing tax function: 
        
                       
                     
  . 
This indicates that inflation taxation and income taxation are substituting instruments 
for government spending as a fixed fraction of output. Clearly, the magnitude of the 
response of the income tax rate to the money growth rate is falling with the money 
growth rate, suggesting that any positive effects of faster money growth on 
investment, innovation, output growth and welfare, if exist, should diminish at higher 
money growth rates.  
 From (17), (18) and (20), we obtain the transition equation of capital: 
11
  
    
    
 
 
               
 
     
 
     
  
 
    if              
    
 
 
                                         if              
              (21) 
Given            ,    is increasing with the money growth rate via the decreasing 
tax function      in both the Solow and Romer regimes.  
 Define          as the ratio of capital to variety, and define a critical level 
      . Also, denote the gross growth rate of capital in the Romer regime by 
                       with                     and        . 
A one-dimensional dynamic system can now be derived from equations (16) and (21) 
as follows: 
     
        
 
     
  
 
       if         
        
     
    
  
    
             if          
                                       (22) 
Since      an     , the ratio of capital to variety is increasing in itself over time 
at a diminishing rate in the Solow regime but decreasing in the Romer regime, which 
may create endogenous cycles. In particular, for             (hence    ), 
Matsuyama (1999) has shown the existence of period-two cycles in the absence of 
government intervention. We now explore how the time-invariant monetary growth 
rule in the context of public finance in equation (20) affects the economy. Given     , 
   is increasing with the money growth rate in both regimes through the growth rate 
   ) according to equation (22). 
 The growth rate of output follows from equation (17) and from substituting 





    
       
  




       if          
                          if         . 
             (23) 
Clearly, the (gross) growth rate of output is greater in the Solow regime than in the 
Romer regime by a factor  
  




    for           therein, and is increasing 
with the money growth rate, given     , in both regimes at different paces (a higher 
pace in the Solow regime than the Romer regime due to the same factor).  
 To complete the determination of the equilibrium, the remaining task is to 
show the transversality condition in equation (7) is valid in equilibrium. Substituting 
              in equation (4) into the first part of (7) and combining it with 
    , (18) and (19) yields: 
    
   
  
     
  
    
   
   
    
 
 
      
        
 
 
      
  . 
Similarly, the second part of equation (7), when combined with equation (10), 
becomes 
    
   
     
     
     
 
     
  
     
   
     
                  
                   
     
which is valid partly because                    and equations (18) and (23) 
imply 
                      
        
 
 
     
  
    
    
  
                     
 
    for 
     , 
and partly because     must be bounded away from zero, or equivalently         
must be finite, in the Solow regime in equations (22) and (23).   
 We now summarize the short-run effects of money growth given a state 




Proposition 1.1: Given any state            , a permanent increase in the time-
invariant money growth rate   reduces the income tax rate      and therefore 
promotes capital accumulation    in both the Solow and Romer regimes. In addition, 
it has a positive effect on the capital-variety ratio    and a lagged positive effect on 
innovation      for    , unless         for all    . Overall, it promotes growth 
in output via      in both regimes.  
 
Proof. Given any state            , a positive effect of a permanent increase in the 
time-invariant money growth rate on capital accumulation    is based on equation 
(21) in both regimes. The absence of an immediate effect of a change in the money 
growth rate on innovation is based on equation (16). As a result, it has a positive 
effect on the capital-variety ratio   , which is transparent in equation (22). With 
certain     periods of lag, the increased capital variety ratio will eventually 
increase innovation      in an updated equation (16), unless innovation cannot take 
place at all in extreme parameterizations such that         for all    . By 
increasing investment and innovation, faster money growth promotes growth in 
output      in both regimes according to (23). Q.E.D. 
  The positive effect of faster money growth on capital accumulation is similar 
to that in Ho, Zeng and Zhang (2007), due to a negative effect of faster money 
growth on the tax rate. This positive effect overcomes underinvestment caused by 
externalities in their AK model and pushes the economy from one balanced growth 
14
  
path to another immediately. In the present model, the positive effect of faster money 
growth has a delayed positive effect on innovation by relaxing the capital 
requirement constraint on innovation and intermediate goods production. The 
consequences of faster money growth on the entire equilibrium path are more 
complicated in the present model with growth through endogenous cycles than in 
their AK model. The complexity lies in the fact that, once innovation occurs due to 
faster money growth, it may reduce the capital-variety ratio in the next period in an 
updated equation (22) and thus make innovation harder to continue in the next period 
in an updated equation (16). In the remainder of this section, we will look at the 
steady state and the dynamics of the equilibrium path in turn. 
 
1.3.1 The steady state 
The steady state level of the capital-variety ratio in the Solow regime is obtained 
from equation (22) under the condition        
    : 
   
           ,         (24) 
which is unique and increasing with the money growth rate  . Here, the 
condition   
     corresponds to         
 The steady state level of the capital-variety ratio in the Romer regime based 
on equation (22) under the condition        
     is 
   
            +  ,        (25)  
which is also increasing with the money growth rate. The condition   
     
corresponds to       .  
15
  
 Overall, whether      is greater or smaller than 1 determines which regime 
prevails in the steady state. Because        , a higher money growth rate makes it 
more (less) likely for the steady state of the Romer (Solow) regime to apply to the 
economy in the long run. According to equations (23), (24) and (25), the steady state 
growth rate of output in the Solow regime is equal to zero, while the steady state 
growth rate in the Romer regime is positive and increasing with the money growth 
rate. We summarize the results in the steady state below. 
 
Proposition 1.2. A permanent increase in the time-invariant money growth rate 
  increases the steady-state capital-variety ratios,    
    
  , in both the Solow and 
the Romer regimes and makes it more likely for the latter to apply to the economy in 
the steady state. There is no sustainable growth in output in the Solow regime in the 
steady state, while the steady state growth rate of output in the Romer regime is 
positive and increasing with the money growth rate.       
 
Proof. The steady-state (balanced) growth rate of the Romer regime is 
determined by equalizing the growth rates of innovation, capital accumulation and 
output in equations (16), (21) and (23), respectively: 
  
    




    
  




    




     which is increasing 
with the money growth rate  . The other results in the proposition follow from our 




 It is worth noting that the steady-state ratio of capital to variety is increasing 
with the money growth rate via the balanced growth factor G    in the different 
regimes at different paces. Also, the money growth rate does not change the critical 
ratio of capital to variety    that divides the economy into the Solow and Romer 
regimes. Because positive trends in output growth have been observed in all 
industrial countries, we focus on the situation with a positive growth rate of output 
         to rule out the Solow regime from the steady state in the analysis of 
the global dynamic path. Otherwise the Solow steady state would be stable and would 
imply a constant level of output per capita in the long run in this model. Further, note 
that the growth rate of output in the Romer regime is constant at all times and 
increasing with the money growth rate.  
 The positive long-run relationship between output and money growth 
(inflation) agrees with some previous predictions (e.g., Tobin, 1965; van der Ploeg 
and Alogoskoufis, 1994; Espinosa-Vega and Yip, 1999). This relationship is also 
consistent with some empirical evidence. For example, in low inflation countries a 
permanent rise in the inflation rate is associated with a permanently higher level of 
output in the postwar era, as documented by Bullard and Keating (1995).   
 
1.3.2 The dynamics 
Matsuyama (1999) has analyzed several possible cases of the dynamic path and 
regarded the parameterization            as empirically plausible under 
which period-two cycles arise. We focus on this case as a starting point in our 
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analysis of the dynamics. 
 
Proposition 1.3. Suppose           . The economy has period-two 
cycles permanently if                         
 
 
    for all  ; otherwise, 
it has oscillatory convergence asymptotically toward the balanced growth path of the 
Romer regime for                                      
     
 
 
   .    
 
Proof. Differentiating equation (22) with respect to      in the Romer regime 
yields: 
   
     
 
         
     
    
  
    
   , 
since    . In the steady state of the Romer regime, we must have 




   .                  (26) 
The derivative           at the Romer steady state is thus equal to  
 
   
     
        
     
    
.        (27) 
Under the condition            , the absolute value of the derivative 
          is greater than one for small enough   at the Romer steady state, whereby 
endogenous cycles prevail permanently as in the original paper of Matsuyama (1999). 
Because of        , the absolute value of the derivative           at the Romer 
steady state is decreasing in the money growth rate according to equation (27). If the 
money growth rate   is large enough such that         , the absolute value of 
the derivative           becomes less than one at the Romer steady state, with 
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which the economy becomes oscillatory convergent asymptotically toward the Romer 
steady state (the balanced growth path). According to (20), we obtain  
         
 
 
               
            




    
where the factor 
            




 is increasing in    Therefore, the condition 
         corresponds to     
            




      which cannot hold 
true if 
     





   
     
 , whereby the left hand side is the maximum of 
            




at    . However, if 
     





   
     
 , the condition 
    
            




     is true for   
               
                        
 
 
   
  Q.E.D. 
 
According to Proposition 3, when the money growth rate is high enough such 
that         , money growth is stabilizing by eliminating cycles asymptotically; 
otherwise the economy has endogenous cycles. Such a critical money growth rate for 
stabilizing exists as long as 
     





   
     
 (i.e. the growth rate of output without 
money financing is not too low). In our numerical section, we shall show this 
condition holds for plausible parameterizations. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the two 
situations with period-two cycles and oscillatory convergence, respectively.  
In Figure 1 with period-two cycles, the dynamic path in equation (22) determines 
two stationary levels of the capital-variety ratio jointly by the following two 
equations:  
            
            ,         (28)  
         
      
    
  
  
   
.          (29)  
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Since        
 , we get          
  
  
    from (29). Combining this 
with (26), it follows that      
     where    stands for the Romer steady state in 
Figures 1 and 2. Equations (28) and (29) also imply  
   
  
  . But the sign of  
   
  
 is 
ambiguous, while the upper limit        on  
  is unaffected by  . Despite this 
ambiguity, the ratio of high to low capital per variety       is increasing with the 
money growth rate   as shown below. Using equations (28) and (29) together with 
(16), (18) and (21), we can also determine the growth rates in each regime and over 
the cycles and look at how they respond to money growth. 
We now provide the effects of money growth in equilibrium with period-two 
cycles. 
 
Proposition 1.4. When the economy is in an equilibrium with period-two cycles, 
a permanent increase in the time-invariant money growth rate   has a positive effect 
on    , an ambiguous effect on   , and a positive effect on the ratio of high to low 
capital per variety      . Along the period-two cycles, it has a positive effect on the 
growth rate of   ,    and    in the Romer regime and a positive effect on the growth 
rate of    and    in the Solow regime. Over the cycles, it has a positive effect on the 
average growth rate of   ,    and   .  
 
Proof. Differentiate (28) and (29) with respect to  : 
 




   






          
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
 = 
       
            




Denote the first matrix on the left-hand side by  . Then, its determinant is given 
by:  
        
  
  




   






       .  
Using (29), we observe 
  
  
                   
  
  




    
              
  
  
    
  
    Thus,      . This leads to: 
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because       
  
  
      
                     
 
       
 
        from (28) 
and (29).  
 Let    be the (gross) growth rate of variable  . Substituting equations (28) 
and (29) into (16), (18) and (21) leads to  
(a)                    
            in the Solow 
regime; 
(b)        
  
  
               in the Romer regime; 
(c)               
  
  
    
   
      over the cycles. 
In (a), there is no effect of faster money growth on     but the effect on    
            
      is positive despite an ambiguous        as shown in the 
following steps:  
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Noting that     
  
  
        
  
  
  and that 
  
  
              
       
  
  
    
  




     







            
  
  







   
   . 
 
In (b) and (c), the positive effects of faster money growth on the growth rates are 
through 
   
  
   and        .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4 means that at low rates of money growth such that period-two 
cycles prevail, faster money growth increases the ratio of high to low capital per 
variety and therefore enlarges the fluctuations in the capital-variety ratio. Since faster 
money growth promotes innovations over time by increasing the capital-variety ratio 
according to (16), the increased ratio of high to low capital per variety may also 
enlarge fluctuations in the levels of innovation, investment and output. The result 
calls for caution about the magnitude of the money growth rate when it is intended 
for macroeconomic management concerning business fluctuations. 
Moreover, within a period-two cycle, faster money growth increases the growth 
rate of the variety, capital and output in the Romer regime, and the growth rates of 
22
  
capital and output in the Solow regime. Over period-two cycles, faster money growth 
raises the average, balanced growth rate of the variety, capital and output. 
 
1.4 Calibration and simulation results 
We now provide numerical examples for the theoretical model. Doing so not only 
helps to detail how money growth affects the dynamic path of the economy but also 
helps to reveal how money growth affects welfare as well.  
 
1.4.1 Calibration 
All the parameters in the model are divided into two groups as shown in Table 
4 and Table 5. For the parameters in the first group in Table 4, we choose the values 
in their plausible range available in the literature. For the parameters in the second 
group in Table 5, we calibrate them by setting some variables at their observed 
values according to the US data. 
 The values of parameters in the first group are discussed below. One period 
in this model corresponds to 10 years, chosen from the range of 3 to 18 years as the 
likely patent length in Matsuyama (1999). We choose the annual time discount 
factor to be 0.97, which is in its plausible range in the literature. Accordingly, the 10 
years discount factor   is equal to 0.73. In addition, we set the fraction   28% 
of GDP spent by the government in all cases, which comes from the average ratio of 
tax revenue to GDP in the United States over the period 1965~2006. The initial 
number of intermediate goods    is normalized to 1. The initial capital-variety ratio 
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is set close to the critical value dividing the two regimes. 
          The calibration for the parameters in the second group is based on the 
following observations in the United States: the annual GDP growth rate at 3%, the 
annual inverse velocity of M1 at 0.125 (or 0.61 for M2)
5
, the average annual patents 
growth rate for the last 20 years at 4%, and the ratio of consumption over GDP    at 
40%. The ratio of consumption to GDP at        may appear lower than the 
usually used value above 60% in the US. However, in the Matsuyama model, 
capital refers to both physical and human capital. If househol s’ expen itures on 
education and health are included in private consumption instead of in capital, then 
the ratio of consumption to output would be above 60%. All the values of 
parameters in the second group are pinned down by the calibration simultaneously. 
We view the calibration as the benchmark.  
           It is worth clarifying how we choose the measure of money balance for 
the calibration. On one hand, for the determination of the consumer’s taste 
parameter   for real money balances, it is appropriate to consider M1 and M2, 
which are closer to the money holdings of consumers than the money base M0. On 
the other hand, M0 may seem more suitable for seignorage revenue collected from 
inflation taxation. However, there is no banking sector in this model to link the 
money base M0 to consumers’ money balances M1 an  M2 via a money multiplier. 
Recently, the total amount of QE1 and QE2 was almost 2 trillion US dollars. The 
                                                            
5
 The inverse velocity of money refers to the ratio of real money balance to output. Data 
from the Federal Reserve suggests that the annual inverse velocity of M1 is around 0.125 
and 0.61 for that of M2 for the past decade. Since each period in our model corresponds to 
ten years, we need to adjust real money balance (a stock) and GDP (a flow) from an annual 
ratio to the “ten years” ratio in calibration. 
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most recently announced Q3 is even open-ended. Much of this money injection via 
QEs (e.g. bailout) is a direct provision of loans to the private sector by the US Fed 
under the pressure of credit crunch when the money multiplier shrinks in value. We 
believe that M1 and M2 are more pertinent to be the inflation tax base in order to 
examine the subsequent effect of inflation taxation on capital accumulation, 
innovation, and welfare. 
          Our choice of M1 or M2 is in agreement with Cooley and Hansen (1989) 
who use M1 for aggregate money in their estimation of the welfare cost of inflation 
taxation. Since part of M1 may still earn competitive interest and hence may be 
immunized against inflation taxation, they also use the money base M0 as an 
extreme case which provides a lower bound for the level of the welfare loss. Here, 
we define M1 as the real money balance first and then use M2 to obtain the upper 
bound on the value of    and on the welfare gain.  
 
1.4.2 Simulations  
We report simulation outcomes when the real money balance is measured by 
M1 in Table 6 and by M2 in Table 7, based on a specific parameterization given in 
the top panel. The benchmark cases in these two tables refer to the cases from the 
calibration. For counterfactual experiments, we vary the annual growth rate of 
money         (column 1 of each Table) step by step from the benchmark case 
and report what happens to the income tax rate      (column 2), the annual growth 
rate       
 
    , the annual inflation rate       
 
    , the dynamic feature of the 
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economy, the welfare level, and the consumption equivalent variation in every 
period.  
 The consumption equivalent variation brings the welfare level in the 
benchmark case to the same welfare level of any concerned case. Denote the 
consumption variation as   such that   
                   
 , implying 
              
    
      where superscript   refers to a concerned case and 
  the benchmark. 
           The dynamic feature is described partly by whether the economy has 
cycles in the long run and partly by the ratio of high to low capital per variety in the 
long run. By saying faster money growth is stabilizing in our model, it means that 
doing so either eliminates cycles in the long run or reduces the ratio of high to low 
capital per variety of period-2 cycles in the long run.  
 When the annual money growth rate is increased gradually, the tax rate falls, 
thereby promoting investment, innovations and growth in both Table 6 and Table 7 
as predicted in Proposition 1. However, the rises in the growth rate of output are 
less than proportional to the rises in the money growth rate. Therefore, the inflation 
rate increases with the money growth rate. The dynamic status of the economy 
features convergence always in Table 6 but starts with period-2 cycles in Table 7 at 
low money growth rates ( 1.9% or lower). When period-2 cycles are present in 
Table 7, faster money growth increases the ratio of high to low capital per variety, 
and hence, increases cyclical fluctuations. When the money growth rate exceeds 
 1%, the economy starts to converge to the balanced growth path of the Romer 
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regime with fluctuations around the balanced growth path for many periods. This 
non-monotonic effect of money growth on cyclical fluctuations calls for caution for 
the stabilizing role of money growth. 
 The welfare gain of faster money growth in this model is in part a 
consequence of a positive growth effect of faster money growth in the presence of 
the efficiency losses of monopolistic pricing and taxation, which is captured in 
Table 6 without period-two cycles. Also, the welfare gain is in part a result of the 
elimination of cycles for smoother consumption by faster money growth, which is 
captured by the significant changes in welfare in Table 7 after the economy departs 
from the period-two cycle phase to the convergent path. At the same time, faster 
money growth increases the cost of money holding, through raising inflation, and 
thus reduces welfare according to the Friedman rule.  
   The welfare level peaks at the optimal annual money growth rate of 2.1% 
in Table 6 (2.4% in Table 7). In other words, the positive welfare effect of money 
growth dominates when the annual money growth rate is below 2.1% in Table 6 
with M1 (below 2.4% in Table 5 with M2), whereas the negative welfare effect of 
money growth dominates when the money growth rate exceeds 2.1% in Table 6 
with M1 (2.4% in Table 7 with M2). Intuitively, the positive growth effect becomes 
weaker at the margin (recalling the diminishing effect of faster money growth on 
the tax rate discussed earlier and noting it in the table).  
 Compared to the benchmark based on the US economy, the maximum 
welfare level at the optimal money growth rate is equivalent to a moderate 0.18% 
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increase in consumption in each period in Table 6 (using M1) and to a larger 
increase in consumption, 0.7%, in Table 7 (using M2). The larger welfare gain with 
M2 than with M1 is also intuitive because consumers face a larger inflation tax base 
with M2 than with M1. Related to this intuition, the decline in the income tax rate is 
more sensitive in Table 7 with M2 than in Table 6 with M1. However, both cases 
with M1 and M2 suggest excessive money growth in the benchmark for the United 
States.
6
     
 Although not reported here, it is also worth mentioning that the annual rate 
of return to capital in our model is 9.73% for Table 6 and 9.32% for Table 7 at the 
optimal money growth rate, both of which are close to the average return of stock 
market per year in the US (9.4% during 1900-2011).
7
 Such rates of return are much 
higher in magnitude than the inflation rates ( 0.93% in Table 6 and  0.43 in Table 
7) at the optimal money growth rates. Thus, the corresponding nominal rates of 
returns to capital (cost of holding money) are above 8% annually in our model, far 
beyond the level based on the Friedman rule.   
 
1.5 Conclusion  
In this paper we have investigated how money growth affects investment, 
innovation, endogenous growth, endogenous cycles, and welfare by extending the 
                                                            
6
 Without uncertainty in the form of shocks in this model, we bypass such questions as how 
monetary policy should respond to exogenous shocks. For studies on these questions, see 
Williamson (1996) and Rebelo and Xie (1999). Such shocks may justify part of the 
excessive money growth. 




Matsuyama model to incorporate real money balances in the utility function. As in 
the literature, faster money growth promotes capital investment by reducing the 
income tax rates and by raising the cost of money holding. A new mechanism of our 
analysis is that the positive effect of money growth on investment relaxes the 
capital constraint on intermediate goods production and R&D spending over time so 
as to eliminate cycles and promote innovation and output growth.  
 Concerning how money growth affects business fluctuations, the effect of 
faster money growth on cyclical fluctuations depends on the rate of money growth 
we start with. When the money growth rate is low such that period-two cycles 
prevail, faster money growth increases the ratio of high to low levels of capital per 
variety, a measure of the degree of cyclical fluctuation. Money contraction that halts 
balanced growth can result in chaotic dynamics in this model. When the money 
growth rate is high enough, a further increase in the money growth rate eliminates 
cycles asymptotically over time by increasing the growth rate of capital 
accumulation and innovation. The elimination of cyclical or chaotic fluctuations 
enhances consumption smoothing and thus raises the welfare gains of faster money 
growth.  
 Quantitatively, we find strong positive effects of faster money growth on 
capital accumulation, innovations and output growth in numerical simulations for 
plausible parameterizations calibrated to the US economy. In the benchmark case 
with 3% inflation and 3% output growth as in the US economy, the actual money 
growth rate of 6% per year, along with an income tax rate in the range 25-27%, is 
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found to be consistent with the convergent path with oscillation around the balanced 
growth path for many periods. However, counterfactual experiments suggest that 
the optimal money growth rate should be 2.1% with M1 (2.4% with M2), leading to 
moderate deflation (< 1%) in excess of the Friedman rule. The numerical results 
indicate excessive money growth in the United States. Reducing the 6% money 
growth rate to the optimal rate 2.4% (with M2) can achieve a welfare gain 
equivalent to a 0.7% perpetual increase in consumption. These results may have 
useful policy implications.   
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Table 1.1. Total tax revenue / GDP and per capita GDP levels in G7 countries 
     Tax revenue      Inflation          Patents                    GDP per capita 
      % of GDP      (average  %      by country      US$        % of US level 
         (2005)          1998-2008)     (1996-2009)              (2005) 
 
U.S.  27.3        2.65             1,275,217    42,000        100 
Japan   27.4     0.33                473,244    35,757         85 
Canada 33.4        2.10                  51,948    35,133         84  
Germany 34.8        1.50                142,990    33,854         81  
U.K.  36.5        1.65                  53,583    37,023         88  
Italy  41.0        2.30                  25,263    30,200          72  
France  44.1         1.57                  53,468    33,918                   81  
 
Sources: Date for tax revenue as percentage of GDP are based on Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (2007), Revenue Statistics,1965-2006. 
(Paris: OECD), Tables 3, 10,12, 20, and 24; Data for inflation are also based on the 
OECD publication, taking geometric average from annual data; Data for GDP per 
capita are based on International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
Database, September 2006; Patents granted in the US by country of origin (1996- 





Table 1. 2.  Standard deviation, autocorrelation, and correlation with output:  
US data 1929-2011 at 10 year frequency 










GDP  5.32         1 
 
Consumption   4.97 0.084 0.217 
Investment  10.43        0.633 
Real money 
supply (M1)* 
 17.76        0.520 
R&D**  6.57        0.699 
 
Note. The U.S. original data is taken 10 years average, logged and detrended by a linear-
quadratic time trend. GDP, consumption and investment are from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
all in 2005 dollars. *Nominal M1 during 1929 – 1958 is from Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, 
Appendix Al; 1959 – 2011 is from FED. Nominal M1 divided by annual CPI is real M1. ** 
R&D is non-federally funded R&D expenditures (1953-2009) as reported by the NSF. Different 
from other series, the statistics for R&D series is obtained by treating one period as 9 years due 






















Table 1.3.  Regression results for GDP growth rate and Average income tax / GDP                                 
     
Dependent variable: GDP growth rate                                                
   
   
 M1 growth rate Fed spending / GDP 
   
   
Coefficient                             0.481386                             -0.157944 
Std. Error 0.071902                               0.072095 
t-Statistic 6.695022                                    -2.190763 
R-squared 0.366244  
   
Dependent variable: Average income tax / GDP                                 
     
     
  M1 growth rate Fed spending / GDP 
     
     
            Coefficient               -0.268340                                                    0.478886 
             Std. Error                 0.043596                                0.043713 
              t-Statistic             -6.155193                                10.95526 
             R-squared              0.601996  
     
   
Note: 83 observations come from 1929-2011 annual data. GDP growth rate is from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Nominal M1 during 1929 – 1958 is from Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963, Appendix Al; 1959 – 2011 is from FED. Average income tax over GDP 






Table 1.4. Parameters from related literature 
Para
meter 
Definition Value Source  
   Length of each period 10 
years 
Matsuyama,1999 
  Time discount factor 0.73          
  Government expenditure /GDP 28% Revenue Statistics, 
1965-2006 
   Initial variety level 1 Matsuyama,1999 
   Initial capital-variety ratio 0.50 close to the critical 
value dividing the two 
regimes 















Table 1.5. Parameters calibrated to US data* 
Para
meter 
Definition Value Observation 
   Total factor productivity 
3.3652 
(3.3197) 
Annual GDP growth rate = 3%; 
 
Inverse velocity (real money 
balance/    GDP) of M1 (M2) = 0.125 
(0.61); 
 
Annual  patents growth rate = 4%; 
 
Consumption over GDP ratio  
          . 
  
Taste parameter for the utility of  





























Table 1.6. Simulation result I: Targeting inverse velocity of M1 
 
Parameterization:                                          
                        ,              ; one period equals 10 
years. 
 
 money    income    growth    inflation                dynamic     welfare      -equivalent       
 growth    tax rate      rate         rate           
  
  
       feature         level         variation*     
(annual)                 (annual)    (annual) 
   
     %              %              %                                                                            % 
 -2.30      31.32        2.41       -4.60          1      convergence    2.0453         -6.32 
 -2.00      30.07        2.60       -4.48          1       convergence   2.1534         -3.55 
 -1.00       28.53       2.82       -3.72          1      convergence    2.2613         -0.70 
 0.001      28.00       2.90        -2.81         1       convergence    2.2855        -0.04 
  2.10       27.57       2.96        -0.93         1       convergence     2.2936     0.18 (max) 
  3.00       27.46       2.97          0.00         1       convergence     2.2928       0.14  
  6.09       27.28       3.00         3.00          1       convergence     2.2871  Benchmark 
  9.00       27.20       3.01         5.81          1       convergence     2.2820       -0.14  
 
Note: *The  -equivalent variation refers to the variation in consumption in the 
benchmark case such that the welfare level in the benchmark case is raised to 
the welfare level in the concerned case. The growth rate, the inflation rate, the 
ratio of high to low capital levels and the dynamic features (with or without 




Table 1.7. Simulation result II: Targeting inverse velocity of M2 
 
Parameterization:                                         
                        ,           ; one period equals 10 years. 
 
money    income    growth    inflation                dynamic     welfare      -equivalent       
 growth    tax rate      rate         rate           
  
  
       feature         level         variation*     
(annual)                 (annual)    (annual) 
       %          %             %              %                                                               % 
   -2.00       39.37       0.76        -2.74       1.080     P-2 cycles     1.0096      -25.68 
   -1.90       37.75       1.03        -2.90       1.108      P-2 cycles    1.2033     -21.69 
   -1.00       30.73       2.12        -3.05           1    convergence     1.8978      -5.54 
    0.001      28.00       2.51       -2.45           1    convergence     2.0711     -1.01 
2.40        25.64       2.84        -0.43          1    convergence     2.1348     0.70 (max) 
3.00       25.36       2.88          0.11           1    convergence     2.1333     0.66   
6.09       24.50       3.00          3.00           1    convergence     2.1088   Benchmark 
8.00       24.22       3.04          4.82           1    convergence     2.0923    -0.44  
 
Note: *The  -equivalent variation refers to the variation in consumption in the 
benchmark case such that the welfare level in the benchmark case is raised to the 
welfare level in the concerned case. The growth rate, the inflation rate, the ratio 
of high to low capital levels and the dynamic features (with or without cycles) 
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 Figure 1.2. Oscillatory convergence to    with |
   
     













   
   
        




Social optimality, inflation and taxation in an endogenous cycle model with 
innovation, investment and a cash-in-advance constraint 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Investment, innovation, and social welfare are prime concerns in macroeconomic 
studies of growth, cycles and government policies. Conditioning a Romer-style 
innovation and intermediates production on a Solow-style capital accumulation, 
Matsuyama (1999, 2001) obtains sustainable growth through period-2 cycles for 
empirically plausible parameterization. The monopolistic pricing of new 
intermediate goods creates efficiency losses by reducing the equilibrium quantity of 
new products, final output, investment and innovation, as opposed to the 
neoclassical growth models with perfect competition where the Welfare Theorems 
apply. The endogenous cyclical fluctuation in consumption, investment, and 
innovation may also be a source of inefficiency given diminishing marginal utility. 
This differs from the real business cycle models pioneered by Kydland and Prescott 
(1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) where fluctuations caused by exogenous 
shocks can be socially optimal.  
          However, there are some important questions in the Matsuyama model: One 
may ask whether there is a socially optimal path, whether cycles are socially 
desirable, whether monetary and fiscal policies can achieve the social optimum, and 
how large is the potential welfare gain. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find the 
socially optimal balanced path and optimal government policies to decentralize the 
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social optimum into an equilibrium path of the Romer (1987) model without cycles 
and without capital accumulation. The socially optimal government policies therein 
consist of subsidies on the innovation cost and on the purchase of new intermediate 
goods financed by a lump-sum tax. The answers to our questions remain unclear in 
an extended  growth model with endogenous cycles and with proportional, rather 
than lump-sum, taxes.  
          In this paper, we determine the socially optimal path in the Matsuyama (1999, 
2001) model of growth through cycles and explore whether inflation, subsidization, 
and taxation can be used to decentralize the social optimum under a cash-in-
advance constraint. The socially optimal path allows innovation to occur at a lower 
ratio of capital to variety than that on the equilibrium path. Also, starting from a 
binding capital constraint on innovation, the socially optimal path can move from a 
stage without innovation towards the balanced path with innovation through a 
temporary transition and remains on it thereafter. The decentralization of the social 
optimum into a calibrated US economy indicates a large welfare gain equivalent to 
13% of consumption through money growth, proportional income taxes, and 
proportional subsidies on investment, innovation, and the purchase of new products.        
 As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the subsidy on innovation mitigates 
the dynamic inefficiency of patent protection and the subsidy on the purchase of 
new products mitigates the price differential between new and old products for 
marginal-cost pricing. We also find interactions between monetary and fiscal 
policies. If the investment subsidy rate is below the ratio of consumption to output, 
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money growth promotes investment, innovation, and output growth by substituting 
the income tax and making money holding more costly. If money growth is positive 
and is below the ratio of private spending to output, investment subsidization 
promotes investment, innovation, and output growth by mitigating the distortion of 
income taxation. Moreover, sufficient money growth and investment subsidization 
can eliminate cyclical fluctuations.  
 The idea of using money growth or inflation to promote capital 
accumulation and output growth has empirical relevance (e.g. Meltzer, 2001, 
Nelson, 2002, and papers cited therein). Their baseline models are dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models with money. However, money growth or 
inflation is found to be welfare reducing in many studies due to the Friedman rule 
for a zero cost of money holding (a zero rate of nominal interest) to be equal to a 
zero social cost of money supply.
8
 Positive money growth is found to be optimal 
due to a borrowing constraint in Braun (1994) and Shi (1999), due to investment 
externalities in Rebelo and Xie (1999), and due to separation in asset markets in 
Williamson (2008). The joint use of monetary and fiscal policies is also considered 
in stochastic stick-price dynamic models (e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007; 
Adam and Billi, 2008). Further, some monetary models explore endogenous cycles 
and non-convergent dynamic paths (e.g. Grandmont, 1985, Woodford, 1994, Ascari 
and Ropele, 2007, Leith and Thadden, 2008, and McCallum, 2009). The 
                                                            
8 See, e.g, Friedman (1969), Stockman (1981), Kimbrough (1986), Prescott (1987), Cooley 
and Hansen (1989), Cole and Stockman (1992), Comme (1993), Correia and Teles (1996), 
Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998), Wu and Zhang (2000), 
Lucas (2000), Erosa and Ventura (2002), Gahvari (2007), and Faig and Li (2009).  
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combination of innovation and capital accumulation with endogenous cycles in the 
present model differs from the existing models in several dimensions. First, capital 
accumulation is essential not only for final-goods production but also for innovation 
of new products in the future in the present model. Second, endogenous cycles can 
be sensitive to monetary and fiscal policies compared to cycles driven by 
exogenous shocks. Third, in dealing with monopolistic pricing for new products 
from costly innovation constrained by available capital, monetary and fiscal policies 
may have different roles than in existing models with exogenous shocks. Finally, 
we use monetary and fiscal policies to decentralize the socially optimal path in 
addition to the effects of such policies on allocations.    
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
model. Section 3 determines the equilibrium. Section 4 focuses on  a tractable 
equilibrium with money and investment subsidization. Section 5 considers the 
socially optimal path and a broader set of monetary and fiscal policies for the 
decentralization of the social optimum into equilibrium. Section 6 gives some 
numerical examples. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 The model  
We introduce money and taxes into the Matsuyama (2001) model of 
endogenous growth through endogenous cycles by considering a cash-in-advance 
constraint. The economy has large number of identical, infinitely-lived agents with 




2.2.1 The consumer  
Let        and    be the amount of nominal money balance per agent, real 
consumption per agent, and the price level, respectively. The demand for money is 
driven by a cash-in-advance constraint           . The preference of the 
consumer is defined over discounted utility from consumption in an infinite horizon:  
      
          ,          (1) 
where            is assumed for tractability. 
 Starting with an amount of real money balance        and an asset     in 
period  , a consumer allocates income to current consumption   , money balance 
   and an asset   , given a uniform income tax rate   , a lump-sum transfer from 
the government     , and  an investment subsidy   :  
   
    
  






         ,                (2) 
where           are the real wage rate and the real gross interest rate, 
respectively. Labor supply is fully inelastic and normalized to one unit per 
consumer in this model. The solvency condition faced by the consumer is 
            
 
     . 
The agent maximizes utility      
           subject to (2),    
    
  
 , and 
            
 
     . Denote    and    as multipliers and formulate the 
consumer's problem as: 
            max            
                  
    
  
     + 
                      





             
  
  
  . 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
  
      ,                     (3) 
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.                               (5) 
In (4), the investment subsidy reduces the cost of saving and the income tax 
reduces the benefit of saving. Also, these effects cancel out when we set the 
investment subsidy rate at the next-period income tax rate        .  
 The Kahn-Tucker condition associated with the cash-in-advance constraint 
is:  
        
    
  
        and    
    
  
         
The usefulness of money is twofold here. First, it meets the cash requirement 
for consumption spending. Second, holding additional money may gain from 
deflation. From (3)-(5) and           , the cash-in-advance constraint is binding 
if the money growth rate    is high enough:  




      
    
     hence 
    
  
     if an  only if         
In other words, the agent does not hold more money than just needed for 
consumption spending when the gross money growth rate exceeds the discounting 
factor. The binding solvency condition is             
 
            
    
     . 
  
2.2.2  Production and innovation 
The final goods production uses labor   and a CES composite of intermediate 




      
            
       
 
                                                        (6) 
Here,         is total factor productivity,         is the direct partial 
elasticity of substitution between intermediates, and        is the range of available 
intermediates in period  .  
        One unit of an intermediate uses   units of capital. Intermediates introduced 
prior to  , for           , are sold at the marginal cost         
     . A new 
intermediate, once introduced, is sold under one-period patent protection at a price 
        
             for            . By symmetry, let         
  for 
           and          
  for           .  
Given a subsidy on the purchase of new products         , a firm maximizes 
profit,                        
    
 
              
    
 
             
   
  
                 
   
  , by choosing labor and each type of intermediate. It 
yields the relative demand for old and new intermediates: 




   
  
 




   
       
 
  
,                            (7) 
which is greater than 1 for       , equal to 1 for       , and smaller than 
1 for        .  Unequal use of symmetric intermediates must cause a loss of 
efficiency as aforementioned.  
Given a subsidy on the innovation cost         , each innovation needs   
units of capital and has a one-period monopolistic profit   
    
   
        
  
        . Free entry and breakeven for innovation imply  
       
                           
                   
       .                                                                                                             (8)   
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Innovation and intermediate production are constrained by available capital: 
                       
               
    .           (9) 
From (7) and (8) into (9), the solutions for each intermediate and for the rate of 
innovation are: 
    
    
   




      
    
    
                
  ,               (10)
  
                  
    
  
                  
  
 
               
 ,(11) 
where  




   
, 
which increases with  , ranging from 1 to            for        . 
From (11), new intermediates are introduced if available capital per variety exceeds 
a critical level. 
 From equations (9), (10) and (11), total output is determined by 
   
 
          
         
              
    
    
                
  
              
    
 
  
          
                        
                 
                
    (12)  
where  





   
 
   
. 
If capital per variety is lower than the critical level, then output in the economy 
is determined in a neoclassical style (the Solow regime); if capital per variety is 
higher than the critical level, then output is determined in an AK model in the 
absence of subsidies (the Romer regime). However, in the presence of subsidies, 
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output is linear in both capital and the number of intermediates. 
 
2.2.3  Government 
The government uses a uniform income tax and an inflation tax to finance its 
spending on three kinds of subsidies and a lump-sum transfer: 
                    
   
                                     
  
    
  
.                                                                                                                  (13) 
where       is aggregate (nominal) money supply available at the beginning 
of period   and                      is the growth rate of money supply. In 
equilibrium,          .  
The subsidy on the purchase of new intermediates at a rate    reduces the user 
cost of new intermediates. When the user costs of new and old intermediates 
become the same, the demand for intermediates should be equal. The subsidy on the 
fixed cost of innovation at a rate of    is intended to encourage innovation. The 
subsidy on investment at a rate    reduces the cost of investment and mitigates the 
distortionary effect of income taxation on investment. Since it is more difficult to 
change taxes than to change the money growth rate for revenue in practice, we do 





The capital market clears when        in a closed economy. In this model, final 
output differs from the sum of wage income and capital income when there are 
positive subsidies on the innovation cost and on the purchase of new products as 
follows. From perfect competition in the final good sector, 
      
           
    
 
               
    
 
   can be rewritten as     
      
   
             
         
     . With free entry for innovation, this 
becomes                          
                    
     . 
Collecting terms, we obtain                    
            
   
        
                                      . From this 
equation and (9), the relation between output and factor income is 
                         
                             
     .      (14) 
From the demand of firms for labor,            . Thus, capital income is equal 
to 
                      
 
 
            
                             
     . 
That is, capital income exceeds its typical share in output by the terms 
consisting of subsidies on innovation and on the purchase of new products. When 
the subsidies on innovation and on the purchase of new products are equal to zero, 
final output is equal to total factor income. 
 Denoting        and       , we rewrite the consumer budget 
constraint as:  
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         . 
Similarly, we rewrite the government constraint as: 
                        
   
                             
          
    
  
                    
                    
                    . 
Combining the two constraints together yields          or feasibility in the 
economy. 
 From (13), (14), and the cash-in-advance constraint, the solution to the 
consumer's problem is:  
   
 
  
          
             
   
       
               ,               (15) 
      
 
  
           
             
   
       




      
  
          
                   
   
       
               .(17) 
Here,       refers to output per worker. 
 In the presence of positive subsidies on the innovation cost and on the 
purchase of new products, the model is complicated to obtain an explicit 
equilibrium solution because of the difference between total output and total factor 
income. For a better comparison with the original model of Matsuyama (1999, 
2001), we first consider the case with money and investment subsidization to obtain 
an explicit solution in Section 3 and then consider social optimality and its 
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decentralization through broader government policies in Section 4.   
 
2.3 A tractable equilibrium with money and investment subsidization 
From (3) and (5),     
 
              
          , when the cash-in-advance 
constraint is binding. Substituting it into (4) yields                
                     . Multiplying both sides by    and using           
         and (17) with           and with the cash-in-advance constraint, 
we obtain   
   
    
 
 
                   
                         
    
  
. 
 Assuming a time-invariant money growth rate           and time-
invariant tax/spending rates   and  , one can use the government budget constraint 
in (13) and 
    
  
              in (17) with           to rewrite the 
above equation as  




     
      
  .                     (18)  
Intuitively, the ratio of investment to output is decreasing with the income tax 
rate and increasing with the investment subsidy rate. This confirms that the effects 
of the income tax and investment subsidy cancel out if their rates are set equal in 
this model with not only investment in the literature (e.g. Zhang et al., 2008) but 
also innovation.  
 Using (16) and (18) with         and the equilibrium conditions 
       and       , we obtain the time-invariant relationship between the 
money growth rate and the tax rate: 
50
  
        
                  
 
 
   
              
,                                                      (19) 
 where          at    . This tax function is decreasing with the money 
growth rate for             
 
 
      : 
         
      
               
     
 
 
              . The magnitude of the 
effect of money growth on the tax rate is diminishing with the money growth rate. 
Similarly, this tax function is increasing with the investment subsidy rate for    : 
          
     
 
 
        
                  
  . 
 Let us denote the gross growth rate of capital in the Romer regime by 
            
 
 
                     with                    
    at      Also,             via            under the aforementioned 
conditions, while              Equations (12), (18) and (19) lead to the transition 
equation of capital: 
       
            
 
     
 
     
  
 
                              
    
    
     
                                                                          
                          (20) 
Given            ,    is increasing with the money growth rate and with the 
investment subsidy rate in both the Solow and Romer regimes through        .  
Let us define          as the ratio of capital to variety and define a critical 
level       . From (11) and (20), a one-dimensional dynamic system can now 
be derived as: 
            
           
 
     
  
 
                        
           
     
    
  
    
                                    
                             (21) 
Given            , the ratio of capital to variety is increasing in itself 
over time at a diminishing rate in the Solow regime,            and         
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 , for        , but is decreasing in the Romer regime,  
         , for 
       . In this situation, cycles may occur endogenously. For an empirically 
plausible parameterization               (hence    ), Matsuyama (1999) 
indeed shows the existence of period-2 cycles in the absence of government 
intervention. Given     ,    is increasing with the money growth rate and with the 
investment subsidy rate in both regimes through       ) according to (21) under 
the aforementioned conditions. Moreover, a rise in the money growth rate or in the 
investment subsidy rate also increases the rate of innovation with a lag from (11) 
and from (20) or (21) under the same conditions. 
 The growth rate of output follows from (12) and from substituting out the 
capital stock with output by using a backdated version of (18): 
 
  
    
          
  




                   
                                          
        (22) 
From (22), the (gross) growth rate of output is greater in the Solow regime 
than in the Romer regime by a factor  
  




    for          . Also, the 
growth rate of output is increasing with the money growth rate and with the 
investment subsidy rate under the conditions mentioned earlier, given     , at a 
higher pace in the Solow regime than that in the Romer regime by the same factor.   
 Under the condition        for a binding cash-in-advance constraint, 
the equilibrium path is determined by the one dimensional system in (21) with the 
factor        . The results are summarized below. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that     and that            
 
 
      . 
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Given any state              a permanent increase in the money growth rate or in 
the investment subsidy rate promotes capital accumulation and output growth in 
both the Solow and Romer regimes. It also has a positive effect on innovation in the 
Romer regime with a lag.  
 
Proof. Under    , the cash-in-advance constraint must be binding because 
then       . The rest of the result has been discussed above. Q.E.D.  
 
 The bounds on money growth and on the investment subsidy rate for their 
positive effects on investment, innovation and growth shed new lights on the policy 
analysis. Specifically, if the money growth rate were negative, the effect of higher 
investment subsidization on investment, innovation, and growth would be negative. 
The upper bound on the investment subsidy rate       
 
 
       here is 
associated with the optimal ratio of consumption to output because     
 
 
    
   is associated with the optimal ratio of investment to output in (18). If the 
investment subsidy rate were above this upper bound, faster money growth would 
have negative effects on investment, innovation, and output growth.  
 
2.3.1 The steady state 
The steady-state capital-variety ratio in the Solow regime is from (21) under 
the condition        
     and          : 
   
           
   ,           (23) 
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which is increasing with the money growth rate   and with the investment 
subsidy rate. The steady-state capital-variety ratio in the Romer regime from (21) 
under the condition        
     and            is 
   
               +  ,          (24)  
which is also increasing with the money growth rate and with the investment 
subsidy rate. We give the results in the steady state below. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that         and that        
    
 
 
      . A permanent increase in the time-invariant money growth rate   
or in the investment subsidy rate    increases the steady-state capital-variety ratios, 
   
    
  , in both the Solow and the Romer regimes. There is no sustainable growth 
in the steady state of the Solow regime, while the steady state growth rate in the 
Romer regime is increasing with the money growth rate and with the investment 
subsidy rate.       
 
Proof.  Under    , the cash-in-advance constraint must be binding because 
then       . The steady-state (balanced) growth rate of the Romer regime is 
determined by equalizing the growth rates of innovation, capital accumulation and 
output in equations (11), (20) and (22), respectively: 
  
    




    
  
    
   
  
    




     which 
is increasing with the money growth rate   for             
 
 
     ) 
and with the investment subsidy rate for        . The other results in the 
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proposition follow from our earlier discussions. Q.E.D. 
 
2.3.2 The dynamics 
Starting from the situation in Figure 1 with              for period-2 
cycles in Matsuyama (1999), the equilibrium path with a binding cash-in-advance 
constraint is given below. 
 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that             , that        
    
 
 
      , and that        . If the money growth rate and the 
investment subsidy rate are sufficiently low such that              , then 
the economy has period-two cycles permanently (or even chaotic dynamics for slow 
growth). The economy has oscillatory convergence asymptotically toward the 
balanced growth path of the Romer regime if the money growth rate and the 
investment subsidy rate are high enough such that            .   
 
Proof. In Masuyama (1999), it is shown that: (i) if    , then the economy 
immediately settles down in the Solow regime and converges to the neoclassical 
stationary path; (ii) if          then there are period-2 cycles or chaotic 
dynamics for small   that is close to 1 (see Gardini, Sushko, and Naimzada, 2008, 
for further work on this); (iii) if        then the economy eventually settles 
down in the Romer regime and converges to the balanced growth path. Case (i) is 
excluded here by assumptions about         , a nonnegative investment subsidy, 
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and positive money growth. The difference between cases (ii) and (iii) arises from 
whether or not the Romer steady state is stable. 
 From (21), the slope of the transition equation in (21) is 
         
   
     
 
            
     
    
  
    
  . 




     as shown earlier. Thus, 
the absolute value of the slope of the transition equation in the Romer steady state is 
                        . For the Romer steady state   
  to be unstable to 
fall into case (ii) above, it is required that              . For   
  to be 
globally stable to be in case (iii), it is required that            . As argued 
previously, positive money growth implies a binding cash-in-advance constraint. 
Using the tax function in (19), we rewrite the gross growth rate as: 
            
 
 
                           
       
          
 
 
   
, 
where 
       
          
 
 
   
 is increasing in   and    and is positive under the 
conditions         and            
 
 
       The condition 
            corresponds to       
       
              
     for large enough 
        This situation is illustrated in Figure 2. Q.E.D. 
 
Intuitively, a high enough money growth rate or a high enough investment 
subsidy induces the economy to converge towards the balanced growth path of the 
Romer regime asymptotically by encouraging capital accumulation. 
   
2.4 The socially optimal path and government policies 
56
  
We now consider social optimality and a set of money growth, income taxation and 
subsidization on investment, innovation, and the purchase of new products that can 
decentralize the optimal optimum in equilibrium. The first task is to determine the 
social optimum. 
 
2.4.1 The socially optimal path  
With an indicator function   =0 or 1  the social planner’s problem is formulate  as: 
                 
       
     
                   
              , 
choosing a sequence              
 , where the indicator function    is defined 
as  
     
                
            
 . 
The indicator function prevents the inversion of sunk fixed costs for past 
innovations back to capital for intermediate production or        . The 
symmetry across types of intermediates calls for equal use of each intermediate 
product on the socially optimal path as opposed to the unequal use in equilibrium 
with patens for new products. Also, the diminishing tendency of the marginal 
product of each intermediate product excludes         from the set of optimal 
choices. That is, the social planner finds it optimal to use all available types of 
intermediates evenly. Given the log utility and Cobb-Douglas technology, we 
exclude corner solutions for         at all times. 
 The first-order conditions are given below. 
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      ,          (25) 
        
 
  
      ,             (26)  
           
  
    
                       .       (27)  
These first-order conditions allow for several relevant situations: innovation 
taking place now and next; no innovation now nor next; no innovation now but next.  
 First, let us consider the case in which innovation takes place in two 
consecutive periods (          ). Then, the first-order conditions lead to a 
unique level     
          :   
 
 
   
 
       
 
     
 
 
    
 
      
 
        if        
 .       (28) 
The uniqueness of                arises from the following observations. 
Note that the left-hand side is increasing in    but the right-hand side is decreasing 
in   . Also, note that     , because, as    approaches zero from above, the left 
(right) side approaches zero (infinity). Rewrite (28) as       
 
      
 
     
            implying a unique             . 
 The time-invariant solution    hints constant ratios of consumption and 
investment to output on the optimal path with innovation. Imposing 
    




 on the 
first-order conditions yields a balanced growth path for all periods for     with 
innovation: 
    
  
 
    
  
 
    
  
     
 
 
    
 
      
 
                 
 .      (29) 
To obtain the steady state ratio of capital to variety, we combine the balanced 
growth rate with the alternative expression of the capital constraint on intermediate 
production and innovation: 
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.                      (30) 
Equations (26)-(28) and           lead to     
 :  
    
 =     
 
 
    
 
      
 
                if        
 .     (31) 
From a comparison with (28), a positive solution for      exists as long as   
is large enough (yet less than one). In other words, as is typical in growth models, 
positive growth is possible when the rate of time preference is small (  large) 
enough. 
 If the economy starts with insufficient capital for innovation        
  
then there are two possible cases. In one case is that innovation does not occur at   
but will occur at      The other case is that there is no innovation in both periods. 
We investigate the two cases in turn.  
 If innovation is expected next period but not undertaken this period (     
and       ) under        
 , then       
 ,                   , and    is 
determined from (25), (26), the constraints         
 
       
    
 
             
      
 
       
  
 
      , and 
    
  
 
    
       
           
     as the 
following: 
      
       
    
 
       
 
          
 
  
    
 
   
 
         
 
 
    
 
            .   (32) 
According to (32),    is determined by        
       when        
  and 
when       
  is expected. This case eventually occurs when the starting level 
     is close to   
  in excess of a critical capital-variety rate   such that      
  




              
     
 
     
  
 
     
            
 
           
 
 




       
 , 
which arises from (32) because  
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               .  
By construction,      . 
However, when starting with          innovation is not undertaken now and 
is not expected in the next period (         ). Then, for        we guess 
    




 together with (25), (26),       
 
       
  
 
      , and         
     to obtain the transition equation: 
                   
       
     
   . 
In short, the socially optimal path has three regimes. For         , there 
is no innovation now and next and the capital-variety ratio increases at diminishing 
rates.  For          
 , there is still no innovation now but innovation is 
expected next. For        
 , innovation occurs and continues forever. There is 
no cycle over the three regimes as shown in Figure 2.1. In this sense, endogenous 
cycles engender social costs in this model with diminishing marginal utility for 




Proposition 4. The socially optimal path exists and is unique. For        
   there is no innovation and capital accumulates at a diminishing rate. For 
         
   the economy has no innovation for now and moves to the balanced 
growth path with innovation next. For        
   the economy has innovation and 
remains on the balanced growth path   There is no cycle on the socially optimal 
path. 
 
2.4.2 Optimal policy 
We now consider how to decentralize the socially optimal allocation into an 
equilibrium allocation. In doing so, we use the social optimum as known parameters 
to determine the socially optimal policies. The subsidy on the purchase of new 
intermediate products should be set to equalize the user prices for marginal cost 
pricing         
    
     . Combining this with (7) yields the optimal subsidy 
rate on the purchase of new products: 
      .                               (33) 
The interest rate is determined by       
 
 
    
 
      
 
    where    refers 
to the optimal level of each intermediate product in (28). This allows for the 
determination of the prices as a decreasing function of the optimal level    in (28). 
 The free entry condition and the breakeven condition for innovation require  
   
        
             Combining this with the marginal cost pricing rule 
determines the optimal subsidy rate on the innovation cost: 
     
   
      
                        (34) 
61
  
 Government spending is equal to                       
    
           . We treat the fraction of output spent by the government    as 
exogenously fixed and treat the lump-sum transfer    as a residual to balance the 
government budget. From       
       
  
     





   
 




 .  
 From (3)-(5), the intertemporal optimal condition is          
                                     .  Using the cash-in-advance 
constraint and the money growth formula                at different dates 
in the intertemporal condition gives  
         
              
       
 
                   
       
. 
Using the cash-in-advance constraint again yields: 
          
              
  
 
                   
    
. 
If we set a constant rate of money growth           and equal rates of the 
income tax and investment subsidy        , then using     
     
 
 
    
 
      
 
    in this intertemporal optimal condition  leads to the socially 
optimal intertemporal optimal condition from (25) and (26): 




    
 
 
    
 




     
. 
Equalizing the investment subsidy rate with the income tax rate eliminates the 
investment distortion under capital income taxation as shown in Zhang et al. (2008) 
but cannot achieve the social optimum by itself in the present paper.   
From the consumer decision in (16) and     , the socially optimal ratio of 
investment to output, and the socially optimal growth rate, we can further link the 





   
 




   
 
 
       
                   
               
   




                . Also, note that 
  
    
             
  
   in the social optimum. We then use them to rewrite (35) as:  
 
  
   
 




   
 
 
       
            
     
      
       
               
    
. 
Thus, the optimal money growth rate is determined in the following equation: 
              
          
 
 
      
     
      
       
                  
    
        
 
     
  
 
      
 .              (36) 
Here, the denominator is positive because it simply means 1 minus the 
investment output ratio. The numerator is positive when the income tax rate (    ) 
is sufficiently below the fixed ratio of government spending to output. Recall that 
the subsidy rates   and    are determined already. As a result, there is a range of 
money growth and investment subsidization that can be socially optimal as long as 
their relationship satisfies (36). From (36), the money growth rate is negatively 
associated with the investment subsidy rate (which is equal to the income tax rate). 
 Recall that the budget constraints of the consumer and the government and 
the cash-in-advance constraint together lead to feasibility in terms of the final-good 
allocation. At the same time, we have always maintained the capital constraint on 
intermediate production and innovation. In other words, the optimal government 
policies are feasible for the allocation of the final good and the use of available 
capital. A final consideration is to restrict the lump-sum transfer to be non-negative 
to prevent the use of lump-sum taxation. This restriction is easy to implement for 
high enough income tax/investment subsidy rates     . Because the income tax 
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base must be much greater than the investment subsidy base, there is net tax 
revenue from       . 
Then, we have: 
Proposition 5. For high enough income tax and investment subsidy rates 
      , the socially optimal path can be decentralized into an equilibrium path 
by setting the subsidy rates on the purchase of new products and on the innovation 
cost and the money growth rate as in (33), (34), and (36). 
 
2.5 Calibration and simulation results 
We now provide simulation results for the benchmark equilibrium under the 
cash-in-advance constraint based on a calibration according to the US economy. 
This provides a plausible parameterization for counterfactual experiments to 
determine optimal policies and the potential welfare gain.  
  All the parameters in the model are divided into two groups as shown in Table 
2.1 and Table 2.2. For the parameters in the first group, we choose the values in 
their plausible range available in the literature. For the parameters in the second 
group, we calibrate their values by setting some variables at the values according to 
the US data. 
 Some discussion of parameterizations in Table 2.1 is given as follows. First, 
one period in this model corresponds to 10 years, chosen from the range of 3 to 18 
years as the likely patent length in Matsuyama (1999). Second, the annual discount 
factor equals 0.97, which is in its plausible range in the literature. Accordingly, the 
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10-year discount factor   is equal to 0.74. In addition, the fraction of GDP,   40%, 
spent by the government is based on the average ratio of government spending to 
GDP in the United States over the period 2007~2012. The initial number of 
intermediate goods    is normalized to 1, and the initial capital-variety ratio is set 
close to its stationary values in equilibrium. For comparison between the 
benchmark case with income taxation, money growth and investment subsidization 
and the socially optimal case with additional subsidization on the purchase of new 
products and on the innovation cost, we set         in the benchmark case. In 
the United States, the Investment Tax Credit has been applied to support many 
forms of investment, and in effect, the credits are subsidies for investment. The 
credits differ in various states and different industries, while on average it is about 
10%, which is also suggested by Goolsbee (1998). So we set the rate for the 
investment subsidy at 10%. The average income tax rate is around 13% during 
1987-2009 in the US. However, it is less clear about subsidies on innovation and on 
the purchase of new products in the US. As a result, the assumption          
may not be accurate for the US economy. Thus, we need caution in our 
interpretation of the simulation results.    
   Table 2.2 gives the parameterizations for the rest of the parameters calibrated 
according to observations of the average growth rate of output (3%), the average 
patent growth rate (4%), and the annual inflation rate (3%) in the United States. The 
calibration determines the value of total productivity factor at          , the 
value of the fixed cost   of introducing a new intermediate good via innovation at 
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       , and the value of the partial elasticity of substitution of intermediates 
      .  
    The benchmark equilibrium is reported in Table 2.3. It starts with a 10% 
subsidy on investment and with zero subsidies on innovation and on the purchase of 
new products. In the benchmark, the money growth rate is 6.09%, the growth rate 
of output is 3%, and the inflation rate is 3%. Also, in the benchmark, there are 
period-2 cycles in which the ratio of capital to variety is 35% higher in one period 
than in the other period.  
 Table 2.4 reports the counterfactual result for optimal policies based on the 
same parameterization of the benchmark. Now, we allow the government to utilize 
extra subsidization on the purchase of new products,   , and on the innovation cost, 
  , so as to implement the social optimum.  The optimal income tax rate is chosen 
to be equal to the investment subsidy    (10%). The optimal annual money growth 
rate is 7.58%, roughly 1.5 percentage points higher than the current U.S money 
growth rate.  Accordingly, a moderate annual inflation rate is found to be 1.86%.
9
 
Unlike the exogenously chosen investment subsidy   , subsidy on the purchase of 
new products    and on the innovation cost    are determined endogenously in (33) 
and (34), and their values are 7.04% and 42.82% separately. The annual rate of 
return on capital is 8.85%, which is close to the average return of stock market per 
year in United States (9.4%).
10
  
                                                            
9  In an extended New Keynesian model, Ascari and Ropele (2007) warn against 
indiscriminate use of models assuming zero trend inflation in the monetary policy literature. 
Our results agree with their argument for low trend inflation.  
10 Data for average return of stock market per year in the US are based on DJIA (Dow Jones 
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   Table 2.5 reveals the contrast between the results of the social optimum from 
the socially optimal policies and the results of the benchmark under the cash-in-
advance constraint from the current US policies. The first column is the critical 
point of capital per variety that divides the Solow regime and Romer regime in the 
benchmark case versus the critical point of capital per variety for innovation to 
occur on the socially optimal path. Clearly, the socially optimal path allows 
innovation to occur at a much lower level of the capital-variety ratio (0.5132) than 
that at the equilibrium path (2.5318). The second column is the ratio of old over 
new intermediates      in the benchmark equilibrium and on the socially optimal 
path, respectively. The greater use of old intermediates in the benchmark 
equilibrium induces a greater  efficiency loss, while old and new intermediates are 
used equally on the socially optimal path.  
 The third and fourth columns of Table 2.5 are respective welfare levels in 
the benchmark equilibrium and on the socially optimal path and the variation in 
consumption that raises the equilibrium welfare level to the welfare level on the 
socially optimal path. Here, the welfare gain is equivalent to a 13.04% increase in 
consumption from the benchmark equilibrium to the social optimum. The next 
column shows the respective annual growth rates of innovation as well as output: 3% 
in the benchmark equilibrium versus 5.62% on the socially optimal path. The last 
column shows dynamic features of the two cases. There are period-2 cycles under 
the current policies of the US benchmark, while the socially optimal path features 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Industrial Average) 1900-2011. 
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convergence without cyclical fluctuations.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 In this paper we have determined the socially optimal path in the model of growth 
through cycles in Matsuyama (1999, 2001) and found the socially optimal 
combination of inflation, subsidization, and taxation can be used to obtain the social 
optimum under a cash-in-advance constraint. The socially optimal path allows 
innovation to occur at a lower level of the capital-variety ratio than that on the 
equilibrium path. Such results are new contributions, to the best of our knowledge. 
          We have also investigated how money growth and investment subsidization 
affect investment, innovation, endogenous growth, and endogenous cycles in 
equilibrium by incorporate money through a cash-in-advance constraint. Money 
growth promotes investment, innovation, and growth unless the investment subsidy 
rate is higher than the ratio of consumption to output net of government spending. 
Investment subsidization promotes investment, innovation, and growth as long as 
money growth rates are positive and below the ratio of private spending to output. 
Under such conditions, sufficiently high money growth rates or investment subsidy 
rates can eliminate cycles. However, money growth and investment subsidization 
should be used together with subsidies on innovation and the purchase of new 
products to decentralize the social optimum. 
 Finally, we have calibrated the model to the US economy. From this 
plausible parameterization, the socially optimal policy consists of a 7.58% money 
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growth rate, a 10% investment subsidy rate, a 7% subsidy rate on the purchase of 
new products, and a 42% subsidy rate on innovation costs. This optimal policy 
generates a substantial welfare gain equivalent to a 13% increase in consumption 
over the policy in the benchmark with a 6.09% money growth rate and a 10% 
investment subsidy. It also yields lower inflation at an annual rate 1.86% and much 
faster economic growth at 5.62% compared to the 3% inflation and 3% economic 
growth in the benchmark. This low trend inflation below 2% is rather relevant for 
the experiences of developed countries. The policy implication is to increase money 
growth slightly and increase subsidies on innovation and the purchase of new 












Table 2.1. Parameters come from related literature 
Parameter Definition Value Source  
   Length of each period     10 Matsuyama,1999 
  Time discount factor 0.74          
  Government expenditure 
/GDP 
  40% usgovermentspending.com 
(2008-2012) 
   Initial variety level      1 Matsuyama,1999 
   Initial capital-variety ratio      3 Close to its stationary values 
in equilibrium 
  Units of final goods per unit 
of intermediate goods 
     1 Matsuyama,1999 
   Investment subsidy 10% Goolsbee, 1998 




Table 2.2. Parameters calibrated according to US observations 
Para
meter 
Definition Value Observation 
   Total factor productivity 2.3970 
Annual GDP growth  = 3%; 
Annual  patents growth  = 4%; 
Annual inflation rate =3% 
F 
Fixed cost of innovation 
   0.068 
  
Partial elasticity of substitution 
of intermediates 
14.2 
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Table 2.3. Benchmark equilibrium with        and          
Income 




















Returnon   
(     
% 
13 6.09 3.00 3.00 1.35 Period-2-
cycles 
5.740      7.64  
Note: * The growth rate, the inflation rate, the ratio of high to low capital levels 



















(  ) 
% 
Subsidy on 
fix cost         
% 
Return on   
(     
% 
10 7.58 1.86 7.04 42.82 8.85 
Note:*Growth, inflation, and the return on capital are annual rates.  
 
Table 2.5. Comparison between the benchmark and the social optimum         
 Critical 
capital/variety 















Benchmark  2.5318 2.8206 5.740 Benchmark  3.00% Period-2-
cycles 
Optimum 0.5132 1 15.902 13.04% 5.62% Converge 
Note: *  -equivalent variation refers to the variation in consumption in the 
benchmark case such that the welfare level in the benchmark case is raised to the 

























   
     
    
      
   
    




Intergenerational Links, Taxation, and Wealth Distribution
3.1 Introduction
We extend one of the main ndings in Bossmann et al. (2007): Bequest motives per
se reduce wealth inequality. We show that the result holds for a stronger criterion of
inequality comparison between distributions. Bossmann et al. (2007) use the coef-
cient of variation as the inequality measure. Our Lorenz dominance result implies
their result.
Following Bossmann et al. (2007), we investigate the impacts of intergenerational
links on wealth inequality in a simple two-period overlapping generations model with
heterogeneous agents. Each agent lives for two periods: young period and old period.
Each young agent supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically and has idiosyncratic labor
e¢ ciency risk lt. Old agents do not have labor earnings. Agents have "joy-of-giving"
bequest motives. Government collects an estate tax and redistributes the tax revenue
to all young agents in the economy as a lump-sum transfer.
As in Bossmann et al. (2007), we nd that an economy with bequest motives has a
more equal wealth distribution than an economy without bequest motives. Our result
extends Bossmann et al. (2007) in three respects. First, we only assume that fltg is a
stationary and ergodic while Bossmann et al. (2007) assume that fltg is either i:i:d:
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or a linear mean-reverting process.1 Second, we do not assume that var(lt) < 1.
Bossmann et al. (2007) uses the coe¢ cient of variation as their inequality measure.
Thus they need the nite variance of wealth distribution. Our inequality measures
are Lorenz curve and Gini coe¢ cient, which only require the existence of the mean of
wealth distribution. Third, our result is stronger than that of Bossmann et al. (2007).
Our Lorenz dominance result implies the coe¢ cient of variation result in Bossmann
et al. (2007).
We then investigate the impacts of ability inheritance on wealth distribution. We
nd that impacts of earnings ability inheritance on wealth distribution is contrary to
those of bequest inheritance. An economy with the inheritance of earnings ability has
higher wealth inequality than an economy without inheritance of ability. De Nardi
(2004) shows that ability inheritance can increase wealth concentration by simulating
a general equilibrium OLG model with bequest motives. Finally, we investigate the
e¤ect of estate taxes on wealth distributions and nd that estate taxes reduce wealth
inequality.
Our theoretical results of the impacts of bequest motives, ability inheritance, and
estate taxes on wealth distribution are about the Lorenz ordering. We do not incor-
porate precautionary savings motives into our model and we have the explicit forms
of individual policy functions. This is di¤erent from the large literature of incom-
plete markets heterogeneous agents models, such as Aiyagari (1994), Castaneda et
1We use fxtg to represent a squence in this paper.
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al. (2003) and De Nardi (2004). These papers usually incorporate precautionary sav-
ings motives, solve agents policy functions numerically, and simulate the stationary
wealth distribution.2
Lorenz dominance is widely used in the literatures of income and wealth inequality.
For example Chatterjee (1994) uses Lorenz dominance to discuss wealth distribution
in a neoclassical growth model.3 And Zilcha (2003) uses Lorenz dominance to study
the income distribution in an economy with two types of intergenerational transfers:
investment of parents in the education of their o¤spring, and capital transfer. Early
literatures include, among others, Atkinson (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
For a recent brief review on this topic see Gajdos and Weymark (2012). We also nd
that the convex order is a convenient tool for our linear model. For example the
convex order is closed under convolutions.4 We use this property in our proof for the
conclusion that estate taxes reduce wealth inequality.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section presents the basic structure
of our model. Section discusses the stationary wealth distribution of our model. We
introduce di¤erent inequality measures in section . We show the e¤ect of bequest
2Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011) also nd explicit forms of indivudual policy functions and
study a stationary wealth distribution. They emphasize the role of idiosyncratic investment rates of
return on producing the observed fat tail of the wealth distribution in the U.S.
3There is a minor di¤erence about "Lorenz dominance" between Chatterjee (1994) and our paper.
In Chatterjee (1994) "X Lorenz-dominates Y " means that X is more unequal than Y , while in our
paper it means that X is more equal than Y .
4Let X1 and X2 be two independent random variables and let Y1 and Y2 be two other independent
random variables. If X1 cx Y1 and X2 cx Y2, then X1+X2 cx Y1+Y2. See the denition of cx
in section . For this property of the convex order see page 120 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010).
5Zhu (2012) studies the impacts of income risk on wealth distributions by using Lorenz dominance
and the convex order.
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motive on wealth distribution in section . Section quests the impacts of ability
inheritance on wealth distribution. Section investigates the e¤ect of estate tax on
wealth distribution. Section concludes the paper. Appendix contains most of the
proofs.
3.2 The model
Our model is an overlapping generations heterogeneous agents economy. Each agent
lives for two periods: young period and old period. Each old agent gives birth to
one child. Each family consists of one parent and one child. There is a continuum of
measure 1 families in the economy. The population of the economy keeps constant.
3.2.1 Agents problem
Young agents work and earn labor earnings. Old agents do not have labor income.
They consume their savings and leave bequests to their children. Each young agent
supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically. But young agents have idiosyncratic labor e¢ -
ciency risk lt. We assume
Assumption 1: fltg is stationary and ergodic.
Assumption 2: lt > 0 has a nite mean. Without loss of generality,
E(lt) = 1:
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Note that we do not need the niteness of var(lt).
Agents have "joy-of-giving" bequest motives. cyt is the consumption in young
period for an agent born at period t, and cot+1 is his consumption in old period. st
denotes his savings. He leaves bequest bt+1 to his child. The wage rate per e¢ ciency
unit is wt. gt is the lump-sum transfer from the government, and  2 [0; 1) is the
estate tax rate. The interest rate is rt+1.
The following gure shows the timing of the model.
Figure 3.1. The timing of the model
At the beginning of period t, an young agent receives bequests bt, and pays the
estate tax bt to the government. He draws his labor e¢ ciency lt, and receives gov-
ernment transfer gt. Then the agent makes consumption and savings decisions. Thus
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1   + 




s:t: cyt + st = wtlt + (1  ) bt + gt
cot+1 + bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st
where   1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.  2 (0; 1) is the time discount
factor.  represents the bequest motive.



























[wtlt + (1  ) bt + gt]








The agents policy functions are linear. These linear functions yield the linear
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relationship of our main equation (8) as in Bossmann et al. (2007).








[wtlt + (1  )'(1 + rt)st 1 + gt] (2)







There is an aggregate production rm in the economy. The rm has a Cobb-Douglas
production function Yt = AKt L
1 
t , where A is the technology level, Kt is capital,
and Lt is labor. The rm chooses Kt and Lt to maximize its prot
max
Kt;Lt
fAKt L1 t   wtLt   (rt + )Ktg
where  is the depreciation rate of capital.







wt = (1  )AKt L t :
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3.2.3 Government
The government collects the estate tax revenue and gives a lump-sum transfer to
young generation. Each young agent receives the same subsidy gt. The government






di means the aggregation of young agents.
3.2.4 General equilibrium
The aggregate population of young agents who are the workers in the economy is 1,
and E(lt) = 1. Thus the labor market clearing condition is
Lt =
Z
ltdi = 1 (4)
where
R







di means the aggregation of young agents.
Aggregating the savings of the equation (2) across young agents and using equa-
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[wt + '(1 + rt)Kt] :
From labor market clearing condition we have rt = AK 1t   , and wt = (1  







[(1  + ')AKt + '(1  )Kt] : (6)
We will concentrate on the steady-state aggregate economy in which the aggregate
capital K, the wage rate w, and the interest rate r are constant.
Proposition 1 The economy has a unique aggregate steady state. An economy with
a higher bequest motive  has a higher steady-state aggregate capital K.
The higher the agents bequest motive, the higher the agents saving incentive.
Thus there is more wealth accumulation. In one extreme case there is no bequest
motive, i.e.  = 0. The steady-state aggregate economy with bequest motives of
 > 0 has a higher aggregate wealth level than the economy without bequest motives.
This plays an important role in our analysis of the impacts of bequest motives on
wealth distribution in section .
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3.3 Wealth distribution
We investigate the stationary distribution of individual wealth accumulation process
in the steady-state aggregate economy. Following Bossmann et al. (2007) we use at+1
to denote the individual wealth (before interest) in period t+ 1. Thus at+1 = st.
From governments budget constraint, we have
gt = g = '(1 + r)K (7)
in the steady-state aggregate economy.
Substituting equation (7) into equation (2) we have the agents wealth accumula-
tion equation in the steady-state aggregate economy
at+1 = c3lt + c4at + c5 (8)












Equation (8) is the main equation of our paper. Our aim is to investigate the
stationary distribution of process fatg in the steady-state aggregate economy. We
will study the stationary distribution of fatg, especially the comparisons of di¤erent
economies in the following sections, by using the linear relationship of equation (8).6
6Our main equation (8) has the same form as equation (20) of Bossmann et al. (2007). But the
expressions of c3, c4, and c5 are di¤erent from those in Bossmann et al. (2007), because we use
di¤erent utility functions from Bossmann et al. (2007). However that di¤erence is irrelavent to the
new ndings of our paper. It is the linear relationship that permits us to establish the results about
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We rst establish the ergodicity of the process fatg.
Proposition 2 0  c4 < 1
In the steady-state aggregate economy aggregate capital K is nite as shown
in proposition 1 and the aggregate savings equal K. Suppose that c4  1, then
at !1 almost surely. And K =1. Thus in the steady-state aggregate economy we
must have c4 < 1. Proposition 2 plays an important role when we characterize the
stationary distribution of process fatg.






1  c4 : (9)
And at converges to a1 almost surely.
As in Bossmann et al. (2007) we show that at converges to a1 almost surely.
Bossmann et al. (2007) establish this result by the two-series theorem. Thus they need
the niteness of var(lt). We use a di¤erent mathematical theorem in Brandt (1986)
and we do not need the niteness of var(lt). But we still obtain the ergodicity of fatg.
Thus at converges to a1 in distribution, denoted by at !st a1. We use this important
property of convergence in distribution when we investigate the impacts of bequest
motives, ability inheritance, and estate taxes on stationary wealth distributions. In
Lorenze domninance relationship between di¤erent economies in our analyses.
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these analyses our strategy is that we rst establish the intuition in static situations,
then we extend the results to stationary wealth distributions by observing that they
still hold when processes approach limiting distributions.
3.4 Inequality measures
We introduce Lorenz dominance and the convex order in this section. The concepts of
Lorenz dominance and the convex order are our basic tools to investigate the impacts
of bequest motives, ability inheritance, and estate taxes on wealth distribution.7
3.4.1 Lorenz dominance
Following Gastwirth (1971), we dene the Lorenz curve for a non-negative random
variable X with a positive nite mean.
Denition 1 Let FX(x) be the cumulative distribution function of a non-negative







F X (t)dt; p 2 [0; 1];
where F X (t) = inffx 2 [0;+1) : FX(x)  tg.
7Our main reference book is Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). A good reference of Lorenz
dominance is Arnold (1987). Another book devoted to the parametric statistical distribution of
economic sizes is Kleiber and Kotz (2003).
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A Lorenz curve satises the scale invariance axiom, i.e. random variables X and




By the Lorenz curve, we dene the Lorenz ordering
Denition 2 For two random variables X and Y , X Lorenz dominates Y if and only
if LX(p)  LY (p), p 2 [0; 1], denoted by X L Y .
Obviously the Lorenz ordering is transitive, i.e. X L Y and Y L Z imply
X L Z. Note that X L Y implies that the distribution X is more equal than the
distribution Y and the Gini coe¢ cient of X is smaller than that of Y .
Another commonly used inequality measure is the coe¢ cient of variation (CV ).






Lorenz dominance implies a relation between two random variables with nite
variances.
Lemma 4 If both X and Y have nite variances, then X L Y implies CV (Y ) 
CV (X).
Proof: See page 68-69 of Marshall and Olkin (2007). 
85
3.4.2 The convex order
Following Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010), we dene the convex order of two random
variables.
Denition 3 For two random variables X and Y , X is smaller than Y in the convex
order, denoted by X cx Y , if and only if
E[(X)]  E[(Y )]
for all convex functions  : R! R, provided the expectations exist.
Roughly speaking, X cx Y means that Y is more likely to take on "extreme"
values than X. That is, Y is "more variable" than X.8
Note that the functions 1 and 2, dened by 1(x) = x and 2(x) =  x, are
both convex. Thus X cx Y implies E(X) = E(Y ), provided the expectations exist.
From the denition of the convex order, we see that the convex order is transitive,
i.e. X cx Y and Y cx Z imply that X cx Z.
For two non-negative random variables the convex order is closely related to the
Lorenz ordering.9 Theorem 3.A.10 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) states that
8See page 109 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010).
9For two random variables X and Y with equal means, a su¢ cient and necessary condition for





G(u)du for all x;
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Lemma 5 Let X and Y be two non-negative random variables with equal means.
Then X cx Y if and only if LX(p)  LY (p) for all p 2 [0; 1].
3.5 Bequest motive and wealth inequality
In order to emphasize the impacts of bequest motives on wealth distribution, following
Bossmann et al. (2007), we set estate tax rate  = 0. Thus c5 = 0. The agents wealth
accumulation equation (8) becomes
at+1 = c3lt + c4at:
Following Bossmann et al. (2007), we assume that there are two economies: econ-
omy A and economy B. Agents in economy A do not have bequest motive, i.e.  = 0.
Agents in economy B have bequest motive, i.e.  > 0 (B for bequest). Let aA1 be
the stationary wealth distribution of economy A, and aB1 be the stationary wealth
distribution of economy B.
In economy A there is no bequest motive and c4 = 0. Thus
at+1 = c3lt
provided the integrals exist, where F () and G() are the cumulative distribution functions of X
and Y , respectively. See Theorem 3.A.1 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). This is a practical
way to establish X cx Y . If E(X) = E(Y ), then X cx Y is equivalent to that X second-order
stochastically dominates Y . Thus the following lemma 5 is essentially the result of Atkinson (1970).
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which has the same Lorenz curve as lt. Thus aA1 has the same Lorenz curve as lt.
In economy B there are bequest motives. By proposition 2 we have 0 < c4 < 1.











Thus aB1 has the same Lorez curve as Z 
P+1
s=1(1  c4)cs 14 ls. Note that the random
variable Z is a weighted average of random variables, l1, l2, l3,    . Our analysis of
the impacts of bequests on wealth distribution starts from this observation.
Theorem 3.A.36 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) shows that
Lemma 6 Let X1, X2,    , Xn and Y be n+1 random variables. If Xi cx Y , i = 1,




whenever ai  0, i = 1, 2,    , n, and
Pn
i=1 ai = 1.
Lemma (6) shows that the weighted average would not increase inequality. We
extend this intuition to the comparison of stationary wealth distributions aA1 and a
B
1.
Theorem 7 Under assumptions 1 and 2, aB1 L aA1.
Note that aB1 L aA1 also implies that the Gini coe¢ cient of aB1 is smaller than
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that of aA1. An economy in which agents have bequest motives has a more equal
wealth distribution than an economy in which agents do not have bequest motives.
Our result extends that of Bossmann et al. (2007) in three respects:
First, we only assume that fltg is a stationary and ergodic. Bossmann et al. (2007)
assume that fltg is either i:i:d: or a linear process as in assumption 3 of section in
our paper.
Second, we do not assume that var(lt) < 1. Bossmann et al. (2007) uses the
coe¢ cient of variation as their inequality measure. Thus they need the nite variance
of wealth distribution. Our inequality measures are Lorenz curve and Gini coe¢ cient,
which only require the existence of the mean of wealth distribution.
Third, our result is stronger than that of Bossmann et al. (2007). Bossmann et
al. (2007) derive the coe¢ cient of variation of wealth, the inequality measure, by
calculating mean and variance of the wealth distribution. By lemma 4, theorem 7
implies that CV (aA1)  CV (aB1), as shown in Bossmann et al. (2007).
3.6 Ability inheritance and wealth inequality
Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) use di¤erent data sets in the United States to
study the intergenerational mobility and nd that the elasticity of childs earnings
with respect to parents earnings is about 0:4. We study the impacts of bequest
inheritance on wealth distribution in the last section. In this section we study the
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impacts of ability inheritance on wealth distribution. To that end we, following Davies
and Kuhn (1991) and Bossmann et al. (2007), use a mean-reverting process as the
labor e¢ ciency process.
Assumption 3:
lt+1 = l + v(lt   l) + "t+1 (10)
where l = 1 and 0 < v < 1. f"tg is i:i:d: with a zero mean, a nite variance, and a
lower bound su¢ cient to keep lt+1 > 0.
In this section we permit  2 [0; 1). Thus there could be government transfer.
The agents wealth accumulation equation has the general form
at+1 = c3lt + c4at + c5
as in equation (8).
Let l1 starts from the unique stationary solution of equation (10).10 Then fltg is
stationary and ergodic.
Proposition 8 l+"1 cx lt, 8t  1. Thus the distribution of l+"1 Lorenz-dominates
10For the existence and uniqueness of the stationary solution of equations Yn = AnYn 1 + Bn,
n = 1, 2,    , with independent pairs f(An; Bn)g, see Vervaat (1979). The conditions in assumption
3 guarantees that there exists a unique stationary solution of equation (10) by part (b) of Theorem
1.6 of Vervaat (1979).
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lt, 8t  1.
Following Esary et al. (1967) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010), we introduce
the concept of positive association.
Denition 4 Random variables X1, X2,   , Xn are said to be positively associated
if
Cov (h1 (X1, X2,    , Xn) ; h2 (X1, X2,    , Xn) )  0
for all increasing functions h1 and h2 for which the above covariance is dened.
By Proposition 20.I.13 of Marshall and Olkin (2007), the ability inheritance im-
plies that fltg are positively associated. Also from equation (10) we have
Proposition 9 Let a1 = 1. Then at and lt are positively associated for t  1.
Actually, from the proof of proposition 9, we see that if a1 is independent of l1
and f"tg, then at and lt are positively associated for t  1.
We assume that there are two economies: economy H and economy I. Agents
in economy H do not have ability inheritance, i.e. v = 0. Agents in economy I
have ability inheritance, i.e. 0 < v < 1 (I for inheritance of ability). Let aH1 be
the stationary wealth distribution of economy H, and aI1 be the stationary wealth
distribution of economy I.
Theorem 3.A.39 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) states that
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Lemma 10 Let X1, X2,   , Xn be positively associated random variables, and let








Lemma 10 is intuitive. For two random variables X and Y with positive correla-
tion their sum is more unequal than that of two independent random variables with
the same marginal distributions as X and Y respectively, because there is a sorting
mechanism with the positive correlation. We extend this intuition to the comparison
of stationary wealth distributions aH1 and a
I
1.
Theorem 11 Under assumption 3, aH1 L aI1.
Contrary to inheritance of bequests, the inheritance of ability causes higher wealth
inequality. The di¤erence between inheritance of bequests and inheritance of ability
on wealth distribution as shown in theorems 7 and 11 is due to the di¤erent impacts





since 0 < c4 < 1 in economy B. However, the inheritance of ability only introduces






3.7 Estate tax and wealth inequality
When investigating the impacts of estate taxes on wealth distribution, we concentrate
on the logarithmic utility as in Bossmann et al. (2007).
Assumption 4: Utility functions are logarithmic.
We need an additional assumption.
Assumption 5: fltg is i:i:d:






ln cyt + (ln c
o
t+1 +  ln[(1  ) bt+1])
s:t: cyt + st = wtlt + (1  ) bt + gt
cot+1 + bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st:













1 +  (1 + )






[wtlt + (1  )bt + gt] :
There is no general equilibrium e¤ect of estate tax on the economy. The estate
tax here has only the role of redistribution. The estate tax does not a¤ect aggregate
capital as well as the interest rate and the wage rate.
The individual wealth accumulation equation is
at+1 = c6lt + c7

















 (1 + r)








Again we starts from a static case.
Lemma 12 For a non-negative random variable X with a positive nite mean, if
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0  ^   < 1, then (1   )X + E (X) L (1   ^)X + ^E (X). Thus (1   )X +
E (X) cx (1  ^)X + ^E (X).
A at estate tax plus a lump-sum transfer is equivalent to a progressive tax since
the e¤ective average tax rate is increasing in bequests.11 Lemma (12) implies that
the higher the at tax rate and thus the higher the lump-sum transfer, the lower the
bequest inequality.12
Let a1 be the stationary wealth distribution of an economy with estate tax , and
a^1 be the stationary wealth distribution of an economy with estate tax ^.
Theorem 13 Under assumptions 2, 4, and 5, if   ^, then a1 L a^1.
Theorem 13 extends the intuition of lemma 12 to stationary wealth distributions.
Our theoretical result of theorem 13 supports the simulation results about the impacts
of estate taxes on wealth distributions by Bossmann et al. (2007). Bossmann et
al. (2007) employ i:i:d: labor e¢ ciency with a two-parameter gamma distribution
and nd that estate taxes reduces the Gini coe¢ cient of the wealth distribution by
simulations.
As noted by Bossmann et al. (2007), this result depends on the assumption of
utility functions. For example utility functions with  > 1 in section of our paper
11For an individual with before-tax bequest x, the e¤ective average tax rate is








12See Fellman (1976) for a study on the e¤ect of progressive taxes on income distributions.
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and CES utility in Appendix B.1 of Bossmann et al. (2007) may not work, since
estate tax rate inuences the mean of wealth in these cases.
Using the coe¢ cient of variation as their inequality measure, Bossmann et al.
(2007) show that estate tax reduces wealth inequality for both i:i:d: labor e¢ ciency
and a linear process as in assumption 3 of our paper. We only show this result for the
i:i:d: case. Future work could study whether the Lorenz dominance result also holds
for a linear process as in assumption 3.
3.8 Conclusion
We extends three main ndings in Bossmann et al. (2007). An economy with be-
quest motives has a more equal wealth distribution than an economy without bequest
motives. However an economy with inheritance of earnings ability has higher wealth
inequality than an economy without ability inheritance. An estate tax plus a lump-
sum transfer reduces wealth inequality. Bossmann et al. (2007) establish these results




3.9.1 Proof of proposition 1















 (1  ) 1 
i
(1 + r)1  and r = AK 1   .






   '(1  )
1  + ' : (A.2)




 (1  ) 1 
i
(1+ r)1  = 
(1 ') (1+ r)




(r + ) + '(1 + r)  (1  ')  1 (1 + r)1  1 = 1:
We show proposition 1 in two cases:
Case (i)  > 1




(r + ) + '(1 + r)  (1  ')  1 (1 + r)1  1 :
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The equilibrium r is determined by
h('; r) = 1:
Note that h('; r) is a continuous function of r, with












(1   ')  1 (1 + r)  1 1 > 0 due to  > 1. Thus h('; r)
is a strictly convex function of r. Therefore there must exist a unique equilibrium
r >  .13
Note that h('; r) is strictly increasing in '. For '1 < '2 < 1, suppose that
h('1; r1) = 1 and h('2; r2) = 1:
We have
h('2; r1) > h('1; r1) = 1:
13In the equilibrium r could be negative. Since saving is the only way to bring wealth to the next
period, even if r is negative, the agent still saves.
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Thus r2 < r1 since h('2; ) < 1 and h('2; r) is a continuous function of r. A higher
 implies a higher '. Thus a higher  implies a lower r and a higher K.






























Thus a higher  implies a higher K. 
3.9.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof: Obviously c4  0. From equation (A.2) we have






+ (1  )(1  )
(1  ) + '
Thus
c4 =











(1  ) < 1




 (1  ) 1 
i
(1 + r)1  > 0 and 0 < ' < 1. 
14In this case ~ = (1 + ).
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3.9.3 Proof of proposition 3
Proof: Let Bt = c5+c3lt. Thus fBtg is stationary and ergodic since fltg is a stationary
and ergodic by assumption 1. We have  1  log c4 < 0. Also E(Bt) = c5+ c3 <1,
since E(lt) = 1 by assumption 2. Thus E(logBt)+  E(Bt) < 1. By Theorem 1 of
Brandt (1986) we obtain the results of proposition 3. 
3.9.4 Proof of theorem 7
Proof: Note that aA1 has the same Lorenz curve as l1. We only need to show that
aB1 L l1.
















15We abuse notations a little bit. We use at instead of aBt without confusions.
16Let X be a random variable with a nte mean. E(X) cx X can be established by applying
Jensens Inequality and the denition of the convex order.
17X cx Y implies bX cx bY for any b 2 R. Note that (bx) is a convex function of x 2 R if
(x) is a convex function of x 2 R.
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And










Note that (1   c4)lt + c4 1 c4c3 at is a weighted average of lt and 1 c4c3 at. For 8t  1, lt
and l1 have the same distribution. We have lt cx l1, 8t  1. By lemma 6 we have






By mathematical induction we have
at cx c3
1  c4 l1; 8t  1:




by part (c) of Theorem 3.A.12 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). By lemma 5 we










1 c4 . Thus a
B
1 L l1. 
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3.9.5Proof of proposition 8
Proof: From equation (10) we have





Let l1 starts from the unique stationary solution of equation (10). Then fltg is
stationary and ergodic. We only need to show that l + "1 cx lt+1:






















By Theorem 3.A.34 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have





l + "t+1 cx lt+1:
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Note that l + "1 and l + "t+1, 8t  1 have the same distribution. Thus
l + "1 cx lt+1:
By lemma 5 we have





= E (lt+1) = l. 
3.9.6 Proof of proposition 9
Proof: We know that
at =
1  ct 14
1  c4 c5 +
c3
v   c4 (1  v)
l
ct 14   vt 1 + v   c4 + c4vt 1   vct 14
(1  v)(1  c4)
+ct 14 a1 + c3
vt 1   ct 14















v   c4 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if s = 0
1 if s = 1
cs 14 + c
s 2
4 v + c
s 3
4 v
2 +   + c4vs 2 + vs 1 if s  2
Thus v
s cs4
v c4  0 for s  0. For t  1, at is an increasing function of a1, l1, and "2, "3,
   , "t. Also lt is an increasing function of a1, l1, and "2, "3,    , "t. And a1, l1, and
"2, "3,    , "t are independent. By Proposition 20.I.13 of Marshall and Olkin (2007),
we know that for t  1, at and lt are positively associated. 
3.9.7 Proof of theorem 11








Note that l + "t and aHt are independent.
In economy I, 0 < v < 1. From proposition 9 we know that aIt and lt are positively
associated.
Let aI1 = 1 and a
H







1 + c5 cx c3l1 + c4aI1 + c5 = a2
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since l + "1 cx l1 by proposition 8.18














t cx c3U + c4V
by the property of the convex order in footnote 17 and part (d) of Theorem 3.A.12
of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010).
By lemma 10 we have
c3U + c4V cx c3lt + c4aIt
since aIt and lt are positively associated.
18X cx Y implies bX + c cx bY + c for any b; c 2 R. Note that (bx + c) is a convex function
of x 2 R if (x) is a convex function of x 2 R.
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t + c5 cx c3lt + c4aIt + c5 = aIt+1
by the property of the convex order in footnote 18.
By mathematical induction we have
aHt cx aIt ; 8t  1:
Since aHt !st aH1 and aIt !st aI1, we have
aH1 cx aI1














3.9.8 Proof of lemma 12
Proof: Let
g(x) = (1  )x+ E (X) , x 2 [0;+1)
and
h(x) = (1  ^)x+ ^E (X) , x 2 [0;+1)
Note that g() and h() are non-negative increasing functions dened on [0;+1), since
0  ^   < 1. Also g(x) > 0 and h(x) > 0 for x > 0. Note that h(x)
g(x)
is increasing in




(1  ^)x+ ^E (X)












By Theorem 3.A.26 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have g(X) L h(X), i.e.
(1 )X+E (X) L (1  ^)X+ ^E (X). By lemma 5 we have (1 )X+E (X) cx
(1  ^)X + ^E (X) since E [(1  )X + E (X)] = E(X) = E
h





3.9.9 Proof of theorem 13
Proof: Note that a1 is the stationary distribution of the stochastic process fatg
which is generated by
at+1 = c6lt + c7
h
(1  )at +  K
i
and a given a1. And a
^
1 is the stationary distribution of the stochastic process fa^tg
which is generated by
a^t+1 = c6lt + c7
h
(1  ^)a^t + ^ K
i
and a given a^1.




1 cx a^1 by the denition of the convex order.
Now suppose that at cx a^t . By lemma 12 we have











is independent of at and a
^
t . By Part (d) of Theorem 3.A.12
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of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have
(1  ^)at + ^ K cx (1  ^)a^t + ^ K
since ^ K is independent of (1  ^)at and (1  ^)a^t . By the transitivity of the convex
order we have
(1  )at +  K cx (1  ^)a^t + ^ K:
By Corollary 3.A.22 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have c7
h





(1  ^)a^t + ^ K
i
since c7 is independent of (1 )at+ K and (1  ^)a^t+ ^ K. Note
that c6lt and c7
h
(1  )at +  K
i
are independent. And c6lt and c7
h
(1  ^)a^t + ^ K
i




(1  )at +  K
i
cx c6lt + c7
h





By mathematical induction we have
at cx a^t ; 8t  1:
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Since at !st a1 and a^t !st a^1 thus
a1 cx a^1
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